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Government Hacking
A B 5 T R AC T. The United States government hacks computer systems for law enforcement pur-
poses. As encryption and anonymization tools become more prevalent, the government will fore-
seeably increase its resort to malware.
Law enforcement hacking poses novel puzzles for criminal procedure. Courts are just begin-
ning to piece through the doctrine, and scholarship is scant. This Article provides the first com-
prehensive examination of how federal law regulates government malware.
Part I of the Article considers whether the Fourth Amendment regulates law enforcement
hacking. This issue has sharply divided district courts because, unlike a conventional computer
search, hacking usually does not involve physical contact with a suspect's property. The Article
provides a technical framework for analyzing government malware, then argues that a faithful
application of Fourth Amendment principles compels the conclusion that government hacking is
inherently a search.
Part II analyzes the positive law that governs law enforcement hacking, answering fundamen-
tal criminal procedure questions about initiating a search, establishing probable cause and partic-
ularity, venue, search duration, and notice. A review of unsealed court filings demonstrates that
the government has a spotty compliance record with these procedural requirements. The Article
also argues for reinvigorating super-warrant procedures and applying them to law enforcement
hacking.
Finally, Part III uses government malware to illuminate longstanding scholarly debates about
Fourth Amendment law and the structure of surveillance regulation. Law enforcement hacking
sheds new light on the interbranch dynamics of surveillance, equilibrium adjustment theories for
calibrating Fourth Amendment law, and the interplay between statutory and constitutional privacy
protections.
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"Hacking devices, ... of course we do it . . . ."
-James Baker, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation'
INTRODUCTION
Timberline High School was gripped by panic.2 In the span of just over a
week, the suburban Washington school had received nine anonymous bomb
threats, prompting repeated evacuations and police sweeps.' The perpetrator
taunted academic administrators with a slew of emails, and he spooked students
from a threatening social network account.' He also knocked campus computer
systems offline.'
Local police and the county sheriff were stumped. Officers had obtained in-
formation about the perpetrator's network access and accounts, but the traffic
was routed through a pair of computers in Italy and the Czech Republic.6 After
exhausting their conventional investigative tools, the local authorities called in
the FBI.7
1. Jenna McLaughlin, FBI's Secret Surveillance Tech Budget Is 'Hundreds of Millions,' INTERCEPT
(June 25, 2016, 10:49 AM), http://theintercept.com/2o16/o6/25/fbis-secret-surveillance
-tech-budget-is-hundreds-of-millions [http://perma.cc/76J4-GFHD] (quoting Baker).
2. See Raphael Satter, How a School Bomb-Scare Case Sparked a Media vs. FBI Fight, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Mar. 18, 2017), http://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2017/how-a-school-bomb-scare
-case-sparked-a-media-vs.-fbi-fight [http://perma.cc/5LZP-KBZ4]. See generally Cyber Div.,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Situation Action Background: Timberline School District (Oct. 29,
2014), in 2 REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FBI DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
at RCFP-44, https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/litigation/rcfpapfoia 2016-02-26
fbidocument production part_2_of_5.pdf [http://perma.cc/SF87-W6VM] (providing
background on the bomb threat and the FBI's decision to impersonate a member of the me-
dia).
3. Lacey loth-GraderArrested in Threats To Bomb School, SEATTLE TIMES (June 14, 2007,4:01 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/lacey-loth-grader-arrested-in-threats-to
-bomb-school [http://perma.cc/4H35-N9KH].
4. See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant at 6-10, In re Search of Any Comput. Access-
ing Elec. Message(s) Directed to Adm'r(s) of MySpace Account "Timberlinebombinfo" and
Opening Messages Delivered to that Account by the Gov't, No. MJ0 7 - 5114 (W.D. Wash. June
12, 2007) (on file with author).
5. See Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI's Impersonation ofa journalist in a Criminal
Investigation, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 9 (Sept. 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2ol6/ol6o7.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z3RN-WCVL].





One week later, FBI agents penned a fake Associated Press article about the
incident.8 They drafted the title and content to pander to the hoaxer's ego, por-
traying him as a tech-savvy prodigy who had outwitted the local authorities.'
Then, they sent a link to the hoaxer's social network account, hoping he would
click.o
He took the bait. When he loaded the news story, he unwittingly installed
FBI malware -which surreptitiously circumvented security protections in his
web browser, bypassed his proxy connection through Italy, and reported his In-
ternet Protocol (IP) address to an FBI server in Virginia." An FBI agent for-
warded the IP address to local police, who determined it was associated with a
Comcast broadband subscriber. They issued an exigent request to Comcast,
which quickly responded with an account name and address.12
Hours later, just after midnight, a SWAT team raided the residence." They
discovered a teenage student who attended Timberline High.14 He immediately
admitted culpability.
Law enforcement malware is not new.16 The earliest reported case is from
2001, when FBI agents snuck into a mafioso's office and installed a system for
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. Id.
ii. Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note 4, at 13; Cyber Div., supra note 2.
12. Cyber Div., supra note 2, at RCFP-46.
13. Id.
14. Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 5, at 16.
15. Id.
16. Referring to these practices as "malware" is a source of some controversy. Compare United
States v. Arterbury, No. 1 5 -CR-182-JHP, 2016 BL 133752, at *6 (N.D. Olda. Apr. 25, 2016) (re-
ferring to FBI software as "malware"), with United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 6o-
02 (E.D. Va. 2016) (objecting to characterization of a government program as "malware"). I
use the term "malware" throughout this Article because, in the field of computer security, it is
the common term for software that subverts a user's device. The term is not intended as a
criticism of government hacking. On the contrary, my view is that hacking can be a legitimate
and effective law enforcement technique. I also use the term to promote consistency and avoid
ambiguity. Government documents have referred to hacking with a wide variety of terms,
including Network Investigative Technique (NIT), Computer and Internet Protocol Address
Verifier (CIPAV), Internet Protocol Address Verifier (IPAV), Remote Access Search and Sur-
veillance (RASS), Remote Computer Search, Remote Search, Web Bug, Sniffer, Computer
Tracer, Internet Tracer, and Remote Computer Trace.
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recording keystrokes." What is new is how often federal law enforcement is de-
ploying malware. "
Over the past decade, privacy and security technologies have become much
easier to use. Individuals and businesses are rapidly adopting technical protec-
tions, especially in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks. Usage of the Tor
anonymization software, for example, has roughly doubled since fall 20139. Ap-
ple has made storage encryption the default for macOS and iOS devices, protects
iMessage conversations with end-to-end encryption, and it is moving toward
greater hardware protections for data.20 Google has mostly made storage encryp-
tion the default for Android devices.2 1 Facebook offers optional end-to-end en-
cryption for messages on its social network and automatic end-to-end encryp-
tion for messages sent via its WhatsApp messaging app.22
17. See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. SUpp. 2d 5 7 2, 574 (D.N.J. 2001). The Scarfo opinion provides
only a summary of the FBI's "Key Logger System," recognizing it as protected from disclosure
under the Classified Information Procedures Act. What details are included suggest a design
with both hardware and software components. Later in 2001, news reports confirmed that the
FBI was developing sophisticated malware, euphemistically entitled "Magic Lantern" and the
"Enhanced Carnivore Project." See Bob Sullivan, FBISofiware Cracks Encryption Wall, MSNBC
(Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3341694/ns/technology and science
-security/t/fbi-software-cracks-encryption-wall [http://perma.cc/Y9D5-WVUA].
18. See Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal
Div., to Judge Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules i (Sept. 18, 2013)
(describing government hacking practices as "increasingly common situations"); see also
Email from [Redacted] to CTCs, Re [Redacted] (Mar. 7,2002), in 5 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 1, https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-os.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3BVV-G6YM] ("[W]e are seeing indications that [the Internet Protocol
Address Verifier (IPAV)] technique is being used needlessly by some agencies. . . .").
ig. See Users [Start Date: 2013-ol-ol, End Date: 2016-12-31, Source: All users], TOR PROJECT,
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html ?start=2013-o1-o1&end= 2016
-12-31&country=all&events=off [http://perma.cc/JNW4-LKNU]. See generally Roger Din-
gledine et al., Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004), http://svn.torproject.org/svn
/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QBZ-YGWW] (describing Tor).
20. Ivan Krstic, Behind the Scenes of iOS Security, YouTUBE (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U [http://perma.cc/N8HR-GU2N].
21. Android 7.1 Compatibility Definition Document, GOOGLE, http://source.android.com
/compatibility/android-cdd.html [http://perma.cc/Q969-WM3C] ("[T] he data storage en-
cryption MUST be enabled by default at the time the user has completed the out-of-box setup
experience.").
22. Messenger Secret Conversations: Technical Whitepaper, FACEBOOK 3 (July 8, 2016),
http://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2ol6/07/secret conversationswhitepaper-i.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3QM6-EZU4]; WhatsApp Encryption Overview: Technical Whitepaper,





These privacy and security technologies provide legitimate and important
protections. But they also inhibit tried-and-true law enforcement techniques.
Investigators used to be able to subpoena an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for
an online suspect's identity; internet anonymization software makes that impos-
sible. Investigators used to be able to serve a search warrant or wiretap order on
a cloud service to obtain a suspect's online communications; end-to-end encryp-
tion makes that impossible. Investigators used to be able to seize a suspect's com-
puter and smartphone and search their data contents; device encryption makes
that impossible. The law enforcement community refers to this trend as "going
dark," and it has sought assistance from technology firms and legislatures to re-
verse the trend.23
There is, to be sure, an ongoing and lively debate over the extent to which
law enforcement agencies are actually "going dark" and how law and policy
should respond if they are.24 One aspect of the debate is indisputable: certain
law enforcement techniques for electronic searches and seizures are no longer
effective, and the natural substitute for those techniques is hacking.25 If the gov-
ernment cannot learn a suspect's identity from his ISP, it can break into his com-
puter and retrieve identifying information. If the government cannot obtain a
suspect's communications from his cloud services, it can break into the suspect's
computer, retrieve stored communications, and intercept future conversations.
If the government cannot read the encrypted data stored on a suspect's devices,
it can break into those devices to extract unencrypted data or the cryptographic
23. See Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and Privacy: Hear-
ingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114 th Cong. i (2015) (joint statement of Sally Quillian
Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States, and James Comey, Director of the FBI); Ma-
jority Staff, Going Dark, GoingForward:A Primer on the Encryption Debate, HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON HOMELAND SECURITY (June 2016), http://homeland.house.gov/wp-content
/uploads/2o16/o7/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf[http://perma.cc/86AK
-42QD].
24. See COMPUT. SCl. & TELECOMM. BD., NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis., ENG'G & MED., EXPLORING EN-
CRYPTION AND POTENTIAL MECHANISMS FOR AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO
PLAINTEXT (2016); Harold Abelson et al., Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Re-
quiring Government Access to All Data and Communications, MASS. INST. TECH. (July 7, 2015),
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97690 [http://perma.cc/E5NV-V74G]; Urs Gasser et
al., Don't Panic: Making Progress on the "Going Dark" Debate, BERIMAN IClIN CTR. FOR INTER-
NET & Soc'Y AT HARV. U. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont
-panic/DontPanicMakingProgress-onGoingDark Debate.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6LFP-TCHW].
25. An archive of FBI documents released under the Freedom of Information Act includes a di-
verse range of requests for hacking assistance. See 1o ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA
RELEASE 1-19, https://www.efforg/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-1o.pdf [http://perma.cc
/T4P6-D9VJ]; 13 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 1-20, https://www.eff
.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi cipav-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD9Z-S7CN].
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material necessary for decryption. These substitution effects are not hypothet-
ical - they are happening today. The FBI has already deployed malware to inves-
tigate a wide range of offenses, including loansharking, harassment, extortion,
fraud, and child pornography. As security and privacy technology becomes more
prevalent, law enforcement hacking will only become more commonplace.
FIGURE 1.








The rapid rise of government malware has, surprisingly, only just begun to
capture judicial attention. Through 2015, there were only a few federal opinions
on the practice. 2 6 In 2016 and 2017, there were nearly a hundred (see Figure 1).27
Scholarly treatment of the subject remains scattershot.28
26. United States v. Pierce, No. 8:13CRIo6, 2014 WL 5173035 (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2014); United
States v. Pierce, No. 8:13CRio6, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108171 (D. Neb. July 28, 2014) (mag-
istrate recommendation in same prosecution); In re Warrant To Search a Target Comput. at
Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 7 5 3 (S.D. Tex. 2013); United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp.
2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
27. The data in Figure 1 reflect individually identified opinions from 2001 to 2014, see supra note
26, and opinions on Westlaw that match the query "network investigative technique" from
2015 to 2017.
28. Recent scholarship has emphasized jurisdictional and venue issues with law enforcement
hacking. See, e.g., Devin M. Adams, The 2016 Amendments to Criminal Rule 41: National Search
Warrants To Seize Cyberspace, "Particularly" Speaking, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 727 (2017); SusanW.
Brenner, Law, Dissonance, and Remote Computer Searches, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43 (2012) (sug-
gesting how to reconcile differing jurisdictional privacy standards in a remote computer
search); Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (2017) (criticizing government hacking for intruding upon
the sovereignty interests of other nations); Orin S. K err & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hack-
ing To Light the Dark Web: What Risks to International Relations and International Law?, 70




An Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 26 (2016) (reviewing proposed revisions to the federal warrant venue
rules); Brian L. Owsley, Beware of GovernmentAgents Bearing Trojan Horses, 48 AKRON L. REV.
315 (2015) (reviewing five district court opinions on government hacking, primarily related to
venue issues).
Several articles have raised policy concerns about technical properties of government mal-
ware. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wire-
tapping on the Internet, 12 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014) (describing policy considera-
tions associated with a shift from conventional wiretapping to law enforcement hacking);
Benjamin Lawson, Note, What Not to "Ware," 35 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 77 (2008) (cat-
egorizing types of government hacking); Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze & Susan Landau,
Insecure Surveillance: Technical Issues with Remote Computer Searches, COMPUTER, Mar. 2016, at
14 (describing policy considerations associated with a shift from conventional wiretapping to
law enforcement hacking).
Authors have also noted how hacking is a response to growing adoption of encryption
and anonymization tools. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds,
GEo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2018) (reviewing law enforcement mechanisms for defeating en-
cryption, including hacking); Stephanie K. Pell, You Can't Always Get What You Want: How
Will Law Enforcement Get What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption
Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599 (2016) (arguing that broader deployment of security technol-
ogy will require the government to either undermine security or resort to hacking); Susan
Hennessey, The Elephant in the Room: Addressing Child Exploitation and Going Dark,
HOOvER INST. (2017), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/hennessey
webreadypdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/6J6Q-JKZK] (arguing that law enforcement hacking is
a legitimate response to child exploitation and encryption and reviewing litigation associated
with the Playpen investigation).
A couple articles have touched on Fourth Amendment considerations for government
malware. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future, 81 MIss. L.J. 1229 (2012) (ar-
guing that if the government remotely retrieves files from a suspect's hard drive, it must obtain
a warrant); Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern Surveillance,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1093-97 (2013) (briefly arguing that most government malware requires
a warrant); see also ACLU et al., Challenging Government Hacking in Criminal Cases, ACLU
(Mar. 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field document/malware guide_3
-30-17-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5UE-ASLW] (reviewing possible challenges to government
hacking under the Fourth Amendment and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
The opinion in United States v. Scarfo generated a small body of commentary. See, e.g.,
Angela Murphy, Cracking the Code to Privacy: How Far Can the FBI Go?, 2002 DUIE L. & TECH.
REv. 0002 (explaining the Scarfo case); Nathan E. Carrell, Note, Spying on the Mob: United
States v. Scarfo-A Constitutional Analysis, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &PoL'Y 193 (2002) (review-
ing Scarfo and arguing that keystroke monitoring should require a super-warrant); Neal Hart-
zog, Comment, The "Magic Lantern" Revealed: A Report of the FBI's New 'Key Logging' Trojan
andAnalysisofltsPossible Treatment in a Dynamic Legal Landscape, 20 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 287 (2002) (arguing that Scarfo was rightly decided); Rachel S. Martin, Note,
Watch What You Type: As the FBIRecords Your Keystrokes, the Fourth Amendment Develops Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome, 4o AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1271 (2003) (arguing that keystroke monitoring
should require a super-warrant).
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This Article aims to begin filling the analytical void, offering guidance for
courts and enriching dialogue with policymakers and scholars.2 9 It also draws
upon law enforcement hacking as the latest flashpoint for electronic surveillance,
using the practice to illuminate and advance longstanding scholarly debates
about the Fourth Amendment.
The balance of the Article is organized in three Parts. Part I begins with a
motivating question of positive law: is government malware necessarily regu-
lated by the Fourth Amendment? The Part provides a technical framework for
evaluating government malware and explains how malware lands in a gap in the
case law on electronic evidence. This Article respectfully submits that many
courts are getting the law wrong: although about half of the lower courts that
have considered the issue have concluded that law enforcement hacking does not
inherently implicate constitutional privacy safeguards, the substantially better
interpretation of doctrine is that government hacking is necessarily a Fourth
Amendment search.
Part II answers fundamental criminal procedure questions about law en-
forcement hacking, including when hacking becomes a Fourth Amendment
The debate about law enforcement hacking is not confined to the United States. The Eu-
ropean Union, for example, is grappling with the same issue. See, e.g., MIRJAGUTHEILET AL.,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR HACKING BY LAw ENFORCEMENT: IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF
PRACTICES (2017) (summarizing how six EU member states and three non-EU countries reg-
ulate law enforcement hacking and providing policy proposals).
29. This Article is focused exclusively on government hacking for law enforcement purposes.
Hacking for national security purposes introduces further legal complications (under the
Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), as well as numerous ad-
ditional policy dimensions. The Article is also exclusively focused on hacking of domestic
computer systems. The extraterritorial scope of the Fourth Amendment remains a subject of
professional and scholarly debate. See generally United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-68 (KBF),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145553, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. io, 2014) (considering how the Fourth
Amendment might apply to the search of a foreign server); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territo-
riality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015) (arguing that traditional Fourth Amendment concepts
of territoriality are a poor fit for electronic data); David G. Delaney, Widening the Aperture on
Fourth Amendment Interests: A Comment on Orin Kerr's The Fourth Amendment and the Global
Internet, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2015) (similar); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment
and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285 (2015) (summarizing territorial Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine and applying it to international data searches).
This Article is also focused exclusively on federal hacking because the factual and legal
issues are better developed for federal law enforcement. It is foreseeable that state, county, and
municipal law enforcement agencies will also adopt hacking as an investigative technique. In
some instances, they already have - commercial tools for breaking into smartphones, for ex-
ample, are already widespread. Future work might consider the status of hacking under state




search, who can issue hacking warrants and under what circumstances, and what
notice is required to owners of hacked devices. This Article also argues for rein-
vigorating super-warrant procedures and applying them to government hack-
ing, in order to channel law enforcement away from surveillance techniques that
impose negative externalities.
Part III shifts to Fourth Amendment theory, using government malware as a
natural experiment for reexamining three areas of scholarly discussion: inter-
branch dynamics in articulating surveillance regulation, recalibrating the Fourth
Amendment to account for new technology, and the interplay between statutory
privacy protections and constitutional privacy safeguards.
I. IS LAW ENFORCEMENT HACKING A FOURTH AMENDMENT
"SEARCH ?
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.o
Over the past century, courts have fashioned this textual command into a frame-
work of information privacy law. The doctrinal analysis proceeds from a foun-
dational question: does a government investigative technique constitute a
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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"search"?"1 If it does, courts will scrutinize the privacy procedures associated
with the tactic.32 If it does not, judicial oversight is nonexistent.
As noted earlier, about half of the district courts that have considered the
issue have - surprisingly- concluded that law enforcement hacking is not nec-
essarily a Fourth Amendment search, and that the most common configuration
of government malware is exempt from ex ante judicial supervision.34 Courts
that have recognized law enforcement hacking as a search, meanwhile, have
tended to offer muddled analyses and struggled to articulate how the Fourth
Amendment applies to malware.
This Part contributes a positive law analysis of government hacking under
the Fourth Amendment. Section A begins with a technology primer, explaining
31. See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129
HARv. L. REv. 1823, 1829 (2016) (describing the threshold inquiry in modem Fourth Amend-
ment law); Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 6o STAN. L. REV. 503, 528-
29 (2007) (same); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1511, 1514
(2010) (same). This Article focuses exclusively on search doctrine rather than seizure doctrine,
because seizures -which are grounded in personal freedom of movement and possessory in-
terests in property -are a poor fit for electronic surveillance. See Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (emphasizing that seizures of persons involve "physical force or show of
authority" (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991))); United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful in-
terference with an individual's possessory interests in that property."). While some courts and
scholars occasionally refer to forms of electronic surveillance (and especially copying data) as
a species of seizure, categorization as a search is more consistent with current Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine.
32. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (sniffby a narcotics dog within residential cur-
tilage); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (location-tracking device attached to a
vehicle); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (location-tracking device in a home).
33. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (aerial surveillance of a greenhouse); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (location-tracking device on public roads); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (numbers dialed on a telephone). While beyond the scope of
this Article, it bears mentioning that the Fourth Amendment provides a limited privacy safe-
guard for otherwise unprotected electronic information that is held by a service provider; the
service provider can assert its own constitutional privacy interest and contest the subpoena's
"reasonableness." See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-77 (1906) (holding that subpoenas must
be reviewed for "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,
75-79 (2d Cir. 1973) (reviewing constitutional limits on subpoenas); In re Application of the
United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 27 03(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 130-39 (E.D.
Va. 2011) (suggesting that a surveillance order served on Twitter might be reviewed for rea-
sonableness).
34. See infra Appendix.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 863 F.3 d 1041, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2017) (providing just one
paragraph of analysis and claiming, erroneously, that the government malware retrieved the




the steps involved in law enforcement hacking - each of which could trigger pro-
tections under the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.
Section B examines two Fourth Amendment perspectives on electronic evi-
dence, corresponding to the two ways in which law enforcement agencies have
conventionally obtained electronic evidence. Courts analogize a physical interac-
tion with a device to cracking open a closed container, triggering constitutional
privacy protections grounded in physical trespass and zones of privacy. By con-
trast, courts analyze data that are compelled from a third-party service pro-
vider - without any physical access - on a category-by-category basis, grounded
in amorphous privacy expectations.
Government malware lands in a twilight zone between these two constitu-
tional perspectives and the corresponding law enforcement techniques. Malware
obtains data directly from a suspect's device - but it usually lacks any physical
contact with the device. Section C tackles this doctrinal ambiguity and posits
that the substantially better application of Fourth Amendment principles is that
hacking is always a search.
A. The Technical Architecture of Government Malware
At a high level of generality, law enforcement hacking occurs in four distinct
technical steps: delivery, exploitation, execution, and reporting.36 This Section
explains each of the steps, drawing on unsealed surveillance applications from
federal investigations.
1. Delivery
The government must first deliver its malware to the target, often in a mes-
sage sent to the suspect's account." The communication includes a description
36. These four steps are borrowed from an influential Lockheed Martin paper on cybersecurity,
which provides a valuable taxonomy of steps in the "intrusion kill chain." See Eric M. Hutchins
et al., Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis ofAdversary Campaigns
and Intrusion Kill Chains, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP. (2011), http://www
.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Paper
-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf [http://perma.cc/MB7A-XUVB].
37. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 29-33, United States v. Hernandez, No. 1:17-mj-oo661 (S.D.
Ind. Aug. 1, 2017) (describing malware delivery by inducing the suspect to open a video shared
on Dropbox); Amended Application for a Search Warrant at 26-28, In re Use of a Network
Investigative Technique for a Comput. Accessing Email Accounts: weknow@hotdak.net,
iama.skank@yandex.com, weknow@mail2actor.com, and skankcatcher@mail2actor.com,
No. 6:17-mj-oo519-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017) (describing malware delivery by causing
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intended to lure the suspect into clicking a link, which directs the suspect's web
browser to a website or content controlled by law enforcement. This type of mal-
ware delivery, dubbed "phishing" in the computer security field, is targeted at
specific individuals.
A more recent law enforcement tactic involves "hidden services" that facili-
tate illicit activity and are only accessible to users of the Tor anonymization soft-
ware.3 8 In these cases, the government identifies the hidden service operator and
seizes the infrastructure, but it continues to operate the service with the addition
of malware." When criminals interact with the website under certain triggering
conditions - for example, by visiting, logging in, or going to specific webpages -
the malware gets delivered. Thus, unlike a phishing attack, this type of "watering
hole" attack is targeted at any individuals who engage in specific behaviors.40
Federal investigators have deployed a watering hole strategy in at least three
investigations: Operation Torpedo in the District of Nebraska (2012),41 an in-
vestigation of the Freedom Hosting platform in the District of Maryland
the suspect to execute a Microsoft Word macro); Application for a Search Warrant at 9, In re
Network Investigative Technique (NIT) for E-mail Address 512SocialMedia@gmail.com, No.
A-12-M- 748 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012) (proposing malware delivery via an email); Third
Amended Application for a Search Warrant at 20, In re Network Investigative Technique
("NIT") for Email Address texan.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 12-sw-o5 68 5 -KMT (D. Colo. Dec.
11, 2012) (same); Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant at 13-14, In re Search of Any
Comput. Accessing Elec. Message(s) Directed to Adm'r(s) of MySpace Account "Timber-
linebombinfo" and Opening Message(s) Delivered to that Account by the Gov't, No. MJo 7 -
5114 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2007) (proposing malware delivery via a social network message).
38. See Tor: Hidden Service Protocol, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html
[http://perma.cc/9NEE-UL6E]. These services are often referred to as the "dark web."
39. The government's continued operation of criminal websites - especially child-pornography
forums - has been a source of substantial controversy. See, e.g., Mike Carter, FBI's Massive Porn
Sting Puts Internet Privacy in Crossfire, SEATTLE TIMEs (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.seat-
tletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbis-massive-porn-sting-puts-internet-privacy-in
-crossfire [http://perma.cc/73L4-8E3Z].
40. See Lerner, supra note 28, at 40-42 (describing the phishing and watering hole strategies for
government malware delivery).
41. See Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access the Website "Hid-
den Service A" Which Is Located at oqm66m6lyt6vxk7k.onion, No. 8:12MJ360 (D. Neb. Nov.
19, 2012) (malware delivery to visitors of the seized "Hidden Service A" service); Application
for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access the Website "Hidden Service B"
Which Is Located at s7cgvirtswvojlis.onion, No. 8:12MJ35 9 (D. Neb. Nov. 19, 2012) (malware
delivery to visitors of the seized "TB3" service); Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search
of Computs. that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A" Located at http://
jkpos24pl2r3urlw.onion, No. 8:12MJ3 56 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Application for
"Bulletin Board A" Search Warrant] (malware delivery to visitors of the seized "PedoBoard"
service). See generally Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website and the FBI Could End Up in Your




(2013),42 and Operation Pacifier (also known as the Playpen Case) in the Eastern
District of Virginia (2015).4 In the course of these investigations, the govern-
ment hacked thousands of computers.44
These are not, to be sure, the only strategies for malware delivery. In at least
one investigation, agents appear to have broken into a criminal's office and sur-
reptitiously installed malware.4 5 In a number of other cases, officers have seized
a criminal's device to conduct a hack, including the high-profile conflict between
Apple and the FBI about decrypting a terrorist's encrypted iPhone.46 in conjunc-
tion with the Freedom Hosting investigation, the FBI assumed operation of an
/operation torpedo [http://perma.cc/ZTG3-JZDM] (describing FBI techniques in "Opera-
tion Torpedo"). The government additionally sought and received at least one wiretap order
authorizing interception of private user communications on a seized service. See United States
v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR1o 7 , 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 5, 2016) (describing a wire-
tap order for private messages); United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL
337263, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (describing a wiretap order for a message board).
42. See Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant at 13-14, In re Search of Computs.
that Access "Websites 1-23", No. 8:13-mj-ol744-WGC (D. Md. July 22, 2013) (malware deliv-
ery to visitors of twenty-three websites related to child pornography hosted on the seized
Freedom Hosting platform); see also K evin Poulsen, FBIAdmits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind
Mass Malware Attack, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.wired.com
/2013/o9/freedom-hosting-fbi [http://perma.cc/9LRE-JPH3] (describing the FBI's investi-
gative technique).
43. See Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant at 23-27, In re Search of Computs.
thatAccess upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15 -SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015) (proposing mal-
ware delivery to visitors of the seized "Playpen" service). Like in the Operation Torpedo in-
vestigation, the government obtained a wiretap order to intercept private messages and chats
between users. Application for an Order Authorizing Interception of Electronic Communica-
tions at 4-5, No. 1:15 -ES-4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015).
44. See Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *1, *5 (noting that "the FBI may have anticipated tens of
thousands of potential suspects" in the Operation Pacifier investigation, because the Playpen
website had over 200,000 registered users and 1,5oo daily visitors); Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 18, 39, United States v. Tippens, No. CRI6-511oRJB (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016) (not-
ing that the investigation involved compromising 1,432 devices inside the United States and
7,281 devices in 120 other countries and territories).
45. See Order at 3-6, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Surreptitious Entry
into the Premises of Merchant Servs., No. 99-4061 (D.N.J. June 9, 1999) (search warrant in
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 20ol), allowing law enforcement entry to
install malware on a suspect's computer).
46. See Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San
Bernardino iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/nationalsecurity/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino
-iphone/2o16/o4/12/5397814a-oode-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html [http://perma.cc
/G6VJ-ACFU] (describing the Apple-FBI dispute); see also In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc.
to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 375-
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email service and delivered malware to specific users.4 7 In future investigations,
agents might seek to gain remote access to a criminal's device by sending com-
mands from a central management server, similar to how the FBI recently disa-
bled criminal malware in a "botnet" consisting of compromised computers.48
Officers could alternatively persuade a software vendor to bundle malware into
an update. The differences in these delivery mechanisms can be subtle and, as
discussed below, can have constitutional implications. But whatever the specif-
ics, the critical first step will always be landing the malware on the criminal's
device.
2. Exploitation
The second step in law enforcement hacking is exploitation. Modern tech-
nology design recognizes that software arrives from a range of sources and that
not all developers are trustworthy. As a consequence, software generally executes
with limited permissions: it can only access specific data and functionality on a
device. Web browsers and mobile devices impose especially strict security "sand-
boxes," requiring that software be written in specific languages and granting ac-
cess only to specific capabilities. Web browsers, for example, will usually only
execute software that is written in the JavaScript language and will provide that
software with access to only the stored data that are associated with the software's
origin. Some sensitive capabilities, such as enabling the device's webcam and
GPS, are only available with a user's affirmative consent. Other device capabili-
ties, such as reading data from unrelated applications, are disallowed altogether.
By imposing these restrictions, sandboxes both conform to and inform a user's
expectations about security and privacy.
Law enforcement hacking necessarily subverts the security barriers associ-
ated with sandboxing in order to give investigators access to the data and features
that they need. Developers of investigative tools identify or purchase security
76 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the FBI could not compel Apple to assist with bypassing the
lock screen on a suspect's iPhone).
47. See Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that
Access Target E-Mail Accounts, No. 8:13-mj-o1745-WGC (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2016) (targeting
malware at users who access specific Tor Mail accounts); Affidavit in Support of Application
for Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access the E-Mail Accounts Described in
Attachment A, No. 8:13-mj-o1 746-WGC (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2016) (similar).
48. See Application and Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for a Search War-
rant, In re Application for a Warrant Under Rule 41 of the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure




vulnerabilities in applications that allow them to circumvent sandboxing protec-
tions. The specific security vulnerability that the government exploits and how
it exploits that vulnerability depend on myriad factors, including the infor-
mation that investigators seek and the software configuration used by the sus-
pects.
In Operation Torpedo, for example, the FBI seized three illicit Tor hidden
services.49 The FBI then sought to identify Tor users who visited those websites.
It did so by exploiting a vulnerability in the Adobe Flash plugin, which- at the
time - many Tor users had enabled in their browser so that they could play vid-
eos embedded on webpages. By design, the Flash plugin allowed those embed-
ded videos to initiate network communications - even if the user never saw or
clicked anything in their web browser. As a security and privacy precaution,
though, Flash network requests were supposed to use the exact same network
settings as the operating system or web browser. In the case of a Tor user, those
network settings would mean sending traffic through Tor. Because of a bug by
Adobe, the protection was incomplete: certain types of network requests by-
passed the network settings, circumventing Tor.so An FBI contractor wrote a
small and invisible Adobe Flash video that did just that, and the FBI launched a
watering hole attack by embedding the video on the illicit websites.
A 2013 investigation by the FBI relied on a much more sophisticated ex-
ploit.52 Working with Irish authorities, the FBI seized Freedom Hosting, a plat-
form for illicit Tor hidden services." The FBI again conducted a watering hole
49. Poulsen, supra note 41.
50. See Flash Ignores FF Proxy Settings, MozILIA (Apr. 30, 2010), http://bugzilla.mozilla.org
/show bug.cgi?id=562880 [http://perma.cc/J93J-HQ3H].
51. See NIT Forensic and Reverse Engineering Report at 3, United States v. Cottom, No. 8:13-cr-
ooloS-JFB-TDT (D. Neb. June 29, 2015) (providing a copy of the FBI software and explain-
ing its functionality).
52. See K en Buckler, Caffsec-malware-analysis, GOOGLE CODE (Mar. 19, 2016), http://
code. google.com/p/caffsec-malware-analysis/source/default/source [http://perma.cc/6X7P
-6WFN] (providing the source code and a forensic analysis of the FBI software); Vlad
Tsyrklevich, Annotation and Analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle Exploit (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://tsyrklevich.net/tbb payload.txt [http://perma.cc/8WBX-7TB6] (providing addi-
tional forensic analysis of the FBI software); see also Crash with Onreadystatechange and
Reload, MozILIA (Apr. 3, 2013), https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show bug.cgi?id=8 57 88 3
[http://perma.cc/NMD5-8MW3] (explaining the Firefox vulnerability).
53. See K evin Poulsen, FedsAre Suspects in New Malware ThatAttacks TorAnonymity, WIRED (Aug.
5, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2o13/o8/freedom-hosting [http://perma.cc/AAQ2-6J54].
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attack by injecting malware into hidden services that resided on the seized Free-
dom Hosting infrastructure.5 4 The specific mechanism for the FBI's hacking dif-
fered, though. The FBI (or, more likely, a contractor) discovered that the Mozilla
Firefox web browser included a serious memory management vulnerability. A
clever website could load an unsandboxed application into Firefox's memory,
then trick Firefox into executing the application. The result was that a website
could take over Firefox, gaining near-total control over the computer. Whenever
a user visited one of the Freedom Hosting websites with a vulnerable version of
Firefox, the FBI's software would take over.
3. Execution
Once law enforcement has circumvented security protections, its software
executes. A simple instance of malware, like in Operation Torpedo, might merely
note the time that the software executed, collect information about the operating
system and processor, and then send a network request that includes the device's
IP address.56
More sophisticated malware can retrieve additional identifying information
via a device's operating system. For example, the FBI's Freedom Hosting mal-
ware collected a computer's name and the unique identifier that the computer's
manufacturer assigned to its network card."
Malware that the FBI deployed in 2015 as part of Operation Pacifier went
slightly further. According to an unsealed surveillance application, the software
stored information about whether the malware had previously executed and re-
trieved the name of the user currently logged into the computer."
54. See Poulsen, supra note 42.
5s. The precise triggering conditions for this malware deployment remain ambiguous. See infra
notes 200 and 256 and accompanying text.
56. See NIT Forensic and Reverse Engineering Report, supra note 51, at 3 (calling the Adobe Flash
interfaces Capabilities.os to determine the operating system, Capabilities.cpuArchitecture to
determine the processor architecture, and Lib.current.loaderlnfo.parameters.id to retrieve a
unique session identifier).
57. See Analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle Exploit Payload, VIAD TSYRKLEVICH (Apr. 6, 2014),
http://tsyrldevich.net/tbb payload.txt [http://perma.cc/VV8L-DJL7] (calling the Windows
Sockets interface gethostnameo to determine the computer's configured name and the inter-
face gethostbyname() to determine the computer's local IP address, then calling the IP Helper
interface SendARP to determine the computer's MAC address).
58. Attachment B to Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access




Some FBI malware goes much further yet. According to two recent district
court opinions, certain configurations of FBI software can remain resident and
operational on a suspect's computer for extended periods and can access files, log
keystrokes, intercept communications, track location, and even enable the com-
puter's camera. 9
4. Reporting
Finally, as the law enforcement software executes on a suspect's device, it
phones home to report investigative information. Any government-controlled
server will work. In the Operation Torpedo investigation, for instance, an FBI
server received malware reports using proprietary webserver software.6 0 in most
cases, an inexpensive server running free software would be more than adequate.
These four steps - delivery, exploitation, execution, and reporting - are fun-
damental to the operation of government malware. And each step could poten-
tially trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Part II will return to the delivery
and execution steps in evaluating when law enforcement hacking becomes a
Fourth Amendment search and how long the search lasts.
The remainder of this Part focuses on the exploitation and reporting steps,
for two reasons. First, the most common form of government malware - used to
identify Tor users - does not trigger the Fourth Amendment at delivery, and it
executes nearly instantaneously.6 1 If there is any constitutional privacy protec-
tion associated with this form of malware, it must reside in the exploitation and
reporting steps. Second, for this type of law enforcement hacking, the exploita-
tion and reporting steps implicate two distinct perspectives on Fourth Amend-
ment privacy; exploitation involves intruding into a suspect's electronic device
(without physical access), while reporting involves extracting discrete categories
of information. The courts are deeply divided about how to reconcile the positive
law, and about half of them are getting it wrong.62
59. See United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR1o 7 , 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 5, 2016);
In re Warrant To Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755-56
(S.D. Tex. 2013).
6o. See NIT Forensic and Reverse Engineering Report, supra note 51, at 4-8 (describing and ana-
lyzing the FBI's backend server code, dubbed Cornhusker).
61. See infra Sections IIA, II.D.
62. See infra Appendix (collecting and comparing cases).
589
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
B. Conventional Methods for Obtaining Electronic Evidence and Corresponding
Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Privacy
Law enforcement agencies have traditionally relied on two methods for ob-
taining electronic evidence, both of which long predate government hacking.
Meanwhile, Fourth Amendment doctrine has developed to reflect two corre-
sponding conceptions of information privacy.
First, investigators might physically seize a device and extract data stored in
the device's memory. They might conduct a forensic examination of a desktop
computer's hard disk, for example, or scroll through the photos on a suspect's
smartphone. Courts have traditionally analyzed these investigative techniques
from a device-centric perspective and applied a line of cases -rooted in English
common law - that safeguards the integrity of personal spaces.
Second, investigators might obtain electronic evidence from third-party ser-
vice providers. They might operate a wiretap on a telephone line, for instance,
or compel an email service to disclose stored messages. Courts analyze these in-
vestigative techniques from a data-centric perspective, tracing to the seminal 1967
opinion in Katz v. United States,63 and emphasize the information that the govern-
ment obtains.
1. Physical Access to an Electronic Device and the Device- Centric Perspective
Since the nineteenth century, the Fourth Amendment's procedural safe-
guards have unambiguously applied to closed containers. 64 Most modern opin-
ions frame this protection in the familiar language of Katz: a person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a sealed package, such that a
government intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. 65 Courts are es-
pecially protective of the home, which has long been at the core of Fourth
Amendment privacy protection.6 6
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. SeeEx parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (" [R]egulations ... cannot be enforced in a way
which would require or permit an examination into ... sealed packages ... without warrant,
issued upon oath or affirmation, in the search for prohibited matter. . . .").
65. E.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) ("By placing personal effects inside a
double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would re-
main free from public examination.").
66. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (" [I]n the case of the search of the
interior of homes - the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected pri-
vacy - there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expecta-




Some opinions on closed containers have also emphasized property rights,
especially following the Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration of trespass as a
Fourth Amendment trigger in United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines.6
Merely touching a closed container for the purpose of obtaining information
may be sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment search protections.68
Reasoning by analogy, courts have extended these closed-container protec-
tions to physical searches of electronic devices. A computer, the thinking goes, is
an electronic (and exceptionally capacious) filing cabinet.6 9 The analogy has its
shortcomings, to be sure. Because of the extraordinary volume and sensitivity of
personal data stored on electronic devices, courts have exempted devices from
conventional limits on closed-container privacy protections. For example, courts
have declined to eliminate privacy protections when a device is searched incident
to arrest,70 when a device is left in an automobile," or when incriminating data
Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. . . .").
67. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5-12 (2013) (followingJones and applying it to a drug-sniff-
ing dog on residential curtilage); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-11 (2012) (noting
a property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment, and applying it to the attachment of
a GPS-tracking device); see also Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St Trials 1029 (CP 1765)
(establishing government liability for trespasses to real and personal property). Whether this
trespass test applies to purely electronic searches remains ambiguous. Jones, 565 U.S. at 426
(Alito, J., concurring) (" [T]he Court's reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly
vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as
opposed to physical, contact. . . .").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d lo86, 1092-93 (9 th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that
police dog contact with the outside of a toolbox, combined with a sniff test for the presence
of drugs, could constitute a Fourth Amendment search). Similarly, manipulating or retaining
a container could constitute sufficient interference with possessory interests to trigger Fourth
Amendment seizure protections. E.g., State v. Kelly, 708 P.2d 820, 823-24 (Haw. 1985).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3 d 711, 718-19 (loth Cir. 2007) (assessing appropriate
Fourth Amendment analogies for computer systems, and concluding that "it seems natural
that computers should fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal
items that command[] a high degree of privacy" (alteration in original) (citation omitted));
see also United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3 d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Individuals generally pos-
sess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers."); Trulockv. Freeh, 275 F-3 d
391, 402-04 (4 th Cir. 2001) (analogizing password-protected files on a shared computer to a
locked footlocker); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3 d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Home owners would of
course have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes and in their belongings - in-
cluding computers - inside the home.").
70. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-95 (2014) (holding that the search incident to
arrest doctrine does not apply to data stored on mobile phones).
71. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3 d 1078, 1087-90 (loth Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the
automobile search exception to the warrant requirement may not apply to computers); Wertz
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are in plain view.72 But in the first instance, when determining whether a search
has taken place, the closed-container analogy has continuing value and vitality.
2. Remote Access to Information via a Third Party and the Data- Centric
Perspective
In Katz v. United States the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the
scope of the Fourth Amendment is not solely delineated by physical barriers. In-
stead, the Court articulated a new conception of Fourth Amendment infor-
mation privacy that emphasizes the data that the government obtains, rather
than the spaces that the government invades. " [T]he Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places," the Court memorably explained." Katz itself dealt with
a positive expansion of constitutional privacy protection, holding that a tele-
phone wiretap constitutes a search even without a physical trespass to install the
wiretap. Congress and the courts have uniformly interpreted Katz to cover all
real-time interceptions of communications content, and recent lower court opin-
ions have similarly recognized Fourth Amendment protection when the govern-
ment accesses stored communications content from a service provider.74
v. State, 41 N.E. 3d 276, 280-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the automobile search ex-
ception does not apply to electronic devices).
72. See United States v. Carey, 1 7 2 F.3 d 1268, 1272-74 (loth Cir. 1999) (declining to apply the plain
view doctrine to computer searches in which investigators opened files not covered by a war-
rant).
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
74. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3 d 266, 283-88 (6th Cit. 2010) (holding that government
access to stored email content is a Fourth Amendment search because, among other reasons,
any other rule would be inconsistent with Fourth Amendment protection for real-time inter-
ception of email content). Although Warshak is only binding within the Sixth Circuit, a num-
ber of courts have cited the opinion with approval. See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831
F.3 d 1292, 1306 (loth Cit. 2016); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3 d 421, 433 (4 th Cit. 2016);
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3 d 88o, 887 (6th Cit. 2016); Vista Marketing, LLC v.
Burkett, 812 F.3 d 954, 969 (ith Cit. 2016). No court has rejected the holding.
In the years following Warshak, the executive branch adopted the position that warrant
protections are appropriate for stored content. See ECPA (Part 1): Lawful Access to Stored Con-
tent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 th Cong. 20 (2013) (statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Acting Assis-
tant Att'y Gen. of the United States); A Response to Your Petition on ECPA, WHITE HOUSE,
http://petitions.obamawhitehouse.gov/petition/reform-ecpa-tell-government-get
-warrant [http://perma.cc/X322-NF6R]. In 2013, the Department of Justice established a for-
mal policy of obtaining a search warrant before accessing stored communications in criminal
investigations. H.R. REP. No. 114-528, at 9 (2016). At present, nearly every major online ser-
vice requires a search warrant before disclosing customer content to a law enforcement agency.




Many information privacy opinions have, however, invoked the Katz test in
a negative manner. Where a piece of information has not been kept entirely secret
from third-party businesses or public vantage points, courts have generally de-
clined to recognize constitutional privacy interests." Courts have held that there
is categorically no reasonable expectation of privacy- and therefore no Fourth
Amendment protection-in subscriber information, 76  communications
metadata,7 7 and geolocation records.7 1 Congress has acted in accord with these
views, developing a (notoriously complex) regulatory scheme within the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act that generally allows for warrantless law en-
forcement access to these types of data.
FRONTIER FOUND. 8 (2015), http://www.eff.org/files/2o15/o6/18/who-has your back 2015
protecting your data from government requests_2o15o618.pdf [http://perma.cc
/M6GS-6ERL].
75. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, lo86-87 ("The Court's current conception of privacy is as a form of total
secrecy .... Since information maintained by third parties is exposed to others, it is not pri-
vate, and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment."). Courts and commentators
have developed a range of terms for describing these doctrines, including the "third-party
doctrine;' "metadata doctrine;' and "public movements doctrine." Whatever the terminology,
the underlying rationales are essentially shared.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3 d 1196, 1204-05 (loth Cir. 2008) (holding that com-
munications subscriber information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment and collecting
similar cases).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3 d 5oo, 509-11 (9 th Cir. 2008) (concluding that sur-
veillance of non-content aspects of communications-i.e., metadata - does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, No. 15-3313, 2017 WL 3389368, at *4-9 (loth Cir. Aug.
8, 2017) (holding that the third-party doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment protection for
retrospective cell-site location information); Graham, 824 F.3d at 424-38 (4 th Cir. 2016)
(same); Carpenter, 819 F.3 d at 886-90 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3 d
498, 505-18 (ith Cir. 2015) (same); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 6oo, 608-15 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); see also United States v. Wallace, 857 F.3d 685
(5th Cir.) (reaching the same conclusion for prospective cell-site location information, though
the opinion was withdrawn and replaced because the case actually involved GPS information),
withdrawn, 866 F.3 d 605 (5th Cir. 2017). But see, e.g., Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 511-26
(Fla. 2014) (reaching the opposite conclusion for prospective cell-site location information
and reserving judgment on retrospective information). The Supreme Court is reviewing Car-
penter in the current term, and, as discussed infra note 122 and accompanying text, is widely
expected to find at least some measure of Fourth Amendment protection for geolocation rec-
ords.
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2012) (authorizing law enforcement access to subscriber records
and telephone metadata with a grand jury or administrative subpoena); id. § 27 03(d) (estab-
lishing an intermediate court order for non-content records, including internet communica-
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C. Obtaining Electronic Evidence by Hacking
Law enforcement hacking thus poses a Fourth Amendment conundrum. It
shares a key feature of physical device searches: the government obtains data
directly from the suspect's device. But it also shares key features of compelling
data from a service provider: there is no physical contact with the suspect's prop-
erty, and the data that the government obtains can be conceptually divided into
content and metadata categories. The following subsections analyze the Fourth
Amendment issues associated with law enforcement hacking, beginning with
easy fact patterns and then turning to challenging scenarios.
1. The Easy Scenarios: Physical Access or Content
Before turning to the difficult fact patterns, it is important to briefly explain
what is not in dispute. When the delivery phase of malware involves law enforce-
ment officers physically interacting with a suspect's device, they unambiguously
engage in a Fourth Amendment search. As explained above, courts have consist-
ently drawn an analogy between physically interacting with an electronic device
and opening a closed container, grounding their analysis in Katz (and more re-
centlyJones). Physical installation of malware equates to cracking open a closed
container, rendering it a Fourth Amendment search.
Even without the closed-container analogy, these fact patterns are easy to
resolve under a straightforward application ofJones. In three recent opinions, the
Supreme Court has grappled with a physical trespass to obtain data that are oth-
erwise constitutionally unprotected. And, in all three cases, the Court has treated
law enforcement's trespassory conduct as sufficient to implicate the Fourth
Amendment.
United States v. Jones evaluated the constitutional protections associated with
a GPS tracking device attached to a suspect's car.so A majority of the Court held
that, regardless of whether there is a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in
a person's location, physically trespassing against a car constitutes a search."
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court assessed police use of drug-sniffing dogs on
real property.82 The majority extended Jones, reasoning that stepping onto a
tions metadata and device geolocation); id. § 2709 (2012) (granting limited authority for ad-
ministrative subpoenas, commonly referred to as national security letters, for subscriber rec-
ords and telephone metadata).
80. 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
81. Id. at 406-11.




porch to conduct a dog sniff is sufficient trespass to become a search, even if there
is no Fourth Amendment protection against a dog sniff alone (because it solely
reveals illegal activity).
Most recently, Riley v. California considered police searches of mobile phones
incident to the arrest of two suspects.84 As a fallback argument in the case, the
United States argued that a suspect has a diminished privacy interest in the call
log stored on his phone because it solely consists of metadata." Both the major-
ity and the concurrence rejected that position, implicitly holding that when po-
lice officers tap away at a suspect's phone they always conduct a search - regard-
less of the specific information that they obtain.8 6 Jones, Jardines, and Riley
unambiguously establish that a physical trespass to obtain information is a
search, even when the information is otherwise constitutionally unprotected.
Analyzing the Fourth Amendment implications of malware is also easy when
the reporting step transmits the content of a communication or a file. Since the
seminal 2010 opinion in United States v. Warshak, courts have consistently held
that the Fourth Amendment protects content held by third-party service provid-
ers.8 7 It would be an absurd result if lesser privacy protections applied when law
enforcement officers obtain the same information through a more intrusive
mechanism (hacking). The government does not appear to have advanced this
position in any case, and, as discussed further below, it has consistently (albeit
implicitly) conceded that hacking to obtain content is a Fourth Amendment
search.
83. Id. at 5-12.
84. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
85. Id. at 2492-93.
86. Id.
87. In re Search of Premises Known As: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW,
2016 WL 1239916, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016) (" [E]very court ... that has participated in
this discussion [of Fourth Amendment protections for electronically stored content]
agrees ... individuals have a right to privacy with respect to email. . . ."); see, e.g., Quon v.
Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3 d 892, 906-o8 (9 th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the
Fourth Amendment protects archived text messages); In re Search of Info. Associated with
the Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis that Is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013) (assuming that the Fourth
Amendment protects private content on a social network).
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2. The Hard Scenario: Remote Access to Metadata
So much for the easy cases. Malware is much more difficult to evaluate under
the Fourth Amendment when the delivery phase does not involve physical con-
tact with the suspect's device and the reporting phase does not include any con-
tent information.
This category includes the most common type of law enforcement hacking:
the FBI's identification of Tor users. The key data that the malware reports is a
suspect's IP address." Law enforcement officers can then use the IP address to
learn the suspect's identity and physical address." Courts have consistently held
that an IP address is constitutionally unprotected metadata, much like a tele-
phone number.9 0 Thus, the typical deployment of government malware is also
the most constitutionally challenging.
The following subsections attempt to provide the best possible articulation
of two positions on how the Fourth Amendment maps onto this scenario. The
first viewpoint, advanced by the United States in a number of district court fil-
ings, is that the Fourth Amendment does not apply because it does not regulate
de minimis or electronic intrusions to obtain metadata.
The opposing perspective, advanced by numerous criminal defendants, is
that the Fourth Amendment does apply in this scenario and protects the elec-
tronic equivalent of a device's physical integrity. I locate much stronger support
for this "logical integrity" principle in both positive law and policy considera-
tions.
a. A Plausible Position: No Fourth Amendment Protection
The usual position of the United States government has been that Fourth
Amendment protections associated with government malware are determined
88. The government's Tor identification malware collects additional information that could trig-
ger constitutional scrutiny, but that information is not typically used in prosecution.
89. They do so by issuing a reverse Domain Name System query (which is free) to find the cor-
responding ISP and then subpoenaing the ISP. See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No.
SACR 1 5 -0013 7 -CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (denying defendant's
motion to suppress evidence in a case where defendant's name and address were discovered
via a subpoena to Time Warner Cable); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529 (E.D.
Va. 2016) (subpoena to Verizon).
go. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94-98 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Suing,
712 F.3 d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (loth Cir.




exclusively by the data that the malware reports. 1 If the malware only sends back
metadata, it is not a Fourth Amendment search, and it is not constitutionally
regulated. If the malware transmits real-time audio, video, or electronic commu-
nications, then heightened Fourth Amendment protections (sometimes dubbed
"super-warrant" protections) will apply.92
According to documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, the
government's current position dates to the mid-2000s, when FBI agents and
gi. E.g., United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence at
10-13, United States v. Schuster, No. 1:16-CR-o 51, 2017 W/L 1154088 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2016)
(arguing that there is no Fourth Amendment protection for government malware that reports
an IP address); Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence at 8-
12, United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-0013 7 -CJC, 2016 WL 4208436 (C.D. Cal.
July 11, 2016) (similar); see also United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR1o 7 , 2016 WL 4179365, at
*6 (D. Neb. Aug. 5,2016) (explaining the government's withdrawal of a stipulation that using
malware to obtain an IP address constitutes a Fourth Amendment search). The United States
also adopted this position in an Eighth Circuit challenge to evidence arising from the Opera-
tion Torpedo investigation. Brief of Appellee at 27-28, United States v. Welch, No. 15-1993
(8th Cit. Aug. 12, 2015). The government's invocation of this argument has not, however, been
uniform. See, e.g., Government's Reply Brief at 22 n.12, United States v. Horton, No. 16-3976,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44757 (8th Cit. Jan. 9, 2017) ("[Defendant] argues ... that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address and the information stored on his com-
puter, but we have not suggested otherwise."); United States' Response in Opposition to De-
fendant's Supplemental Motion To Suppress at 3 n.2, United States v. Gaver, No. 3:16-CR-88
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2016) (withdrawing its earlier argument that obtaining an IP address was
not a search); see also Orin Kerr, What's Missing in the Government's Briefs in the Playpen War-
rant Cases, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/o2/20/whats-missing-in-the- governments-
briefs-in-the-playpen-warrant-cases [http://perma.cc/W9U5-QGUN] (noting that the
United States did not advance this argument in three appeals arising from the Operation Pac-
ifier investigation). The United States also suggested - but then dropped - a similar argument
before the Supreme Court in the context of searching mobile phones incident to arrest. Com-
pare Brief for Petitioner at 42, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-212) (suggest-
ing that a suspect has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his mobile phone's stored call
log), aff' United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (ist Cir. 2013), with Reply Brief for Petitioner at
7, 15-16, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-212) (clarifying that a suspect has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his mobile phone's stored call log, but that a search of the call log incident
to arrest would be "reasonable").
92. See Laurita, 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (describing a super-warrant application for an "Order
Authorizing the Surreptitious Installation of Electronic Keyboard Keystroke and Computer
Screen Capture Recording Devices To Collect Computer Keyboard Keystrokes and Computer
Screen Captures . ."); see also Memorandum from David Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div., to Judge Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Criminal Rules, at 9 (Dec. 22, 2014) (on file with author) (noting that the Wiretap Act, which
is the statutory implementation ofBerger v. New York's super-warrant doctrine, applies to gov-
ernment malware that intercepts electronic communications).
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counsel argued for scoping Fourth Amendment protection according to the con-
tent-metadata distinction." The warrant application in the 2007 Timberline
High School investigation, for example, expressly declined to concede that law
enforcement hacking to obtain identifying information would constitute a search
and necessitate a warrant.9 4
The Department of Justice appears to have held a different opinion until re-
cently, at least internally. Guidance from the Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, dating back to a 2002 memorandum, has consistently recom-
mended a search warrant for law enforcement hacking.9' In 1999, the DOJ led a
federal interagency working group that similarly recognized that malware used
93. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: IPAV (May 11, 20o6), in 3 ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 1, https://www.efforg/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-o3.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9GZR-RD2G] ("I think that you most likely were told that a simple IPAV
would be used initially, in which case I would agree with your initial analysis. [Redacted,
apparent description of additional hacking steps to provide contrast.] This clearly requires a
search and therefore a warrant and/or consent:"); Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re:
[Redacted] (Aug. 24, 2005), in 14 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 36,
https://www.efforg/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/7EA7-XRJM]
("I still think that use of [redacted] is consensual monitoring without need for process ....
That said, I will try to contort my mind into a different position if you still think otherwise.");
Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] (Aug. 23, 2005), in 3 ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND., supra, at
44 (acknowledging that whether a search warrant is required "is a hotly debated issue, and as
of yet there is no policy guidance issued"); Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: UCO
Proposal (Dec. 8, 2004), in 1 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 4,
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-ol.pdf [http://perma.cc/WNX8-EIlA8]
("We all know that there are IPAVs and then there are IPAVs. Of course the technique can be
used in a manner that would require a court order. We need to know how/when to draw the
line for obvious reasons'"); id. at 5 ("I don't necessarily think a search warrant is needed in all
[hacking] cases. . .. "); Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: UCO Proposal (Dec. 1,
2004), in 1 ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND., supra, at 9 (" [T]he safest course is to secure a warrant,
though one might arguably not be required. . . ."); Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re:
IPAVs (Aug. 4, 2004), in 1 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra, at 41 ("There is an argument that
at least the simplest IPAV is essentially akin to a [redacted] command and that under this
principle may be used without a court order.").
94. Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note 4, at 2 n.2 ("In submitting this re-
quest, the Government respectfully does not concede that . .. a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is abridged by the use of this communication technique, or that the use of this technique
to collect a computer's IP address, MAC address or other variables that are broadcast by the
computer whenever it is connected to the Internet, constitutes a search or seizure.").
95. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: UCO Proposal (Dec. 1, 2004), in 1 ELEc. FRON-
TIER FOUND., supra note 93, at 9 ("According to guidance issued by DOJ CCIPS, DOJ has
'consistently advised AUSAs and agnets [sic] proposing to use IPAVs to obtain a warrant to




to identify suspects could trigger constitutional privacy protections. 96 In the
early Operation Torpedo litigation, federal prosecutors even stipulated that law
enforcement hacking is necessarily a Fourth Amendment search - but they with-
drew the stipulation once courts began to conclude otherwise.97
It is not apparent whether federal law enforcement agents have ever deployed
malware without obtaining a search warrant. FBI personnel have emphasized
that the agency is not bound by the DOJ's informal legal conclusions," and one
email hints at past instances of hacking without first obtaining a warrant.99
The government's inclination against recognizing Fourth Amendment pro-
tection is understandable. In the most common type of law enforcement hack-
ing, agents could take action without the roadblocks of developing and demon-
strating probable cause. There is, furthermore, a colorable case law foundation
for the government's position. In several scenarios involving modern investiga-
tive techniques, courts have conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis that em-
phasizes the information that law enforcement obtains, rather than how it ob-
tains it.
This Section attempts to articulate the best precedential basis for the govern-
ment's preferred doctrinal result. Each line of cases plausibly supports the gov-
ernment's position, but even if each line of cases is good law-which is dubi-
ous - each can be readily explained by applying established Fourth Amendment
principles. Therefore, while these cases are consistent with the government's
doctrinal views, they ultimately lend very weak support to the government's po-
sition. The balance of this Section sketches each line of cases, then offers an al-
ternative, principled explanation for each.
96. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS WORKING GRP., ONLINE INVESTIGATIVE PRIN-
CIPLES FOR FEDERAL LAwENFORCEMENT AGENTS 20 (1999) (noting that "agents must be care-
ful to use [identifying] information-gathering tools only as conventionally permitted and not
in a manner unauthorized by the system (as by exploiting design flaws .. .)").
97. Compare United States v. Pierce, No. 8:13CRio6, 2014 WL 5173035, at *8 (D. Neb. Oct. 14,
2014) (describing the stipulation in the Operation Torpedo cases), with Laurita, 2016 WL
4179365, at *6 (describing the government's withdrawal of its stipulation).
98. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: UCO Proposal (Dec. 8, 2004), in 1 ELEC. FRON-
TIER FOUND., supra note 93, at 4 ("[I]t is my understanding that there is a disagreement on
the status of the IPAV between what FBI/OGC says and what DOJ/CCIPS [sic]. If OGC will
set out a policy on this, we will be glad to rely on it.").
99. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: IPAV/CIPAV (Nov. 22, 2004), in 1 ELEc. FRON-
TIER FOUND., supra note 93, at 24 ("He wants all [special agents] to know that [the Office of
the General Counsel] expects a [search warrant] for all IPAV/CIPAV applications (no getting
around [the Operational Technology Division] by going to another Division that currently
doesn't follow CCIPS guidance on this point).").
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i. Mobile Phone Location Tracking
One line of relevant cases arises from mobile phone location tracking. Some
courts have reasoned that, because police officers could track a suspect's public
movements without triggering Fourth Amendment safeguards (i.e., by tailing),
they may obtain the suspect's movements electronically without procuring a
warrant.100
Opinions that consider government access to ordinary cell-site location in-
formation- whether retrospective or prospective - tend to minimize this reason-
ing. The majority view in those cases is that cell-site location information is a
routine business record knowingly disclosed to a third party (i.e., the suspect's
phone company), so it is exempt from Fourth Amendment protection.0 1
The public movements argument is much more prominent in cases that in-
volve generating new location data from mobile phones by, for example, causing
the creation of new cell-site location records or by activing GPS functionality
that is built-in for emergency purposes.102 The third-party disclosure argument
is strained in these cases, because there is no routine and voluntary creation of a
business record. Instead, the government affirmatively causes the suspect's de-
vice to generate incriminating location data.03 Some courts considering these
ioo. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F-3 d 942, 951-52 (6th Cit. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1100
(2005).
101. See supra note 78 (collecting cases on cell-site location information and the Fourth Amend-
ment).
102. Courts have not been consistent in their terminology for these practices. See, e.g., United
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3 d 772, 787 (6th Cit. 2012) (suggesting that "ping" data is cell-site
location information and distinct from GPS data); United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d
341, 346 (D. Vt. 2013), aff'd, 831 F.3 d 9 5 (6th Cit. 2016) (using the same term to reference both
cell-site location information and GPS data). Courts have also been spotty on the technical
details of these practices. A panel of the Fifth Circuit, for example, recently misunderstood an
instance of GPS tracking as an instance of prospective cell-site location information tracking.
See United States v. Wallace, 857 F.3 d 685 (5th Cir.) (reaching the same conclusion for pro-
spective cell-site location information, but later withdrawing and replacing the decision be-
cause the case actually involved GPS information), withdrawn, 866 F.3 d 6o5 (5th Cir. 2017).
103. The third-party doctrine rationale is even further strained when the government collects lo-
cation data directly, such as with a "cell-site simulator" device (commonly called an "IMSI
catcher" or "Stingray"). See Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment
Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGs L.J. 183 (2014) (explaining cell-site simulator technology
and surveying district court opinions). Given the relative paucity of case law on cell-site sim-
ulators - to date, not one federal appellate court has rigorously reviewed the technology - the
discussion above emphasizes other mobile-phone tracking techniques. See United States v.
Ellis, No. 13-CR-oo818 PJH, 2017 WL 3641867, at *1-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017) (determining
that police use of a cell-site simulator is a Fourth Amendment search); United States v.




investigative techniques have consequently emphasized the types of data that the
government obtains.
A pair of Sixth Circuit opinions exemplify this line of argument. In a 2004
ruling, a three-judge panel concluded that government-generated mobile phone
location data is "simply a proxy" for a police tail, and does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.104 Another panel reaffirmed that holding in 2012, elaborat-
ing that "[u] sing a more efficient means of discovering [the same public loca-
tion] information does not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation."o It bol-
stered its conclusion with the observation that " [1] aw enforcement tactics must
be allowed to advance with technological changes, in order to prevent criminals
from circumventing the justice system."106
A parallel argument can easily be constructed for government malware. Law
enforcement hacking, the reasoning goes, is "simply a proxy" for subpoenaing
unprotected network configuration information. "Using a more efficient means
of discovering [the same network configuration] information does not amount
to a Fourth Amendment violation." And to hold otherwise would allow criminals
to "circumvent[] the justice system," rewarding them with heightened constitu-
tional protections when they employ anonymization software.
ii. ISP Surveillance
Another line of cases involves surveilling internet usage. In order to monitor
a suspect's web browsing and email metadata, investigators sometimes examine
the network data flowing through the suspect's ISP. In these instances of surveil-
lance, investigators rely on a "pen/trap" order, which involves substantially less
procedural protection than a search warrant.10 7 Law enforcement officers serve
168 A.3d 7 o3, 711-13 (D.C. 2017) (same); State v. Andrews, 134A. 3 d 324, 339-52 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2016) (same); see also United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 543-44 (7 th Cit. 2016) (not-
ing a split in authority on the issue).
104. Forest, 355 F.3d at 951.
105. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 779.
io6. Id. at 778. While I have many reservations about the Skinner opinion, I find this part particu-
larly objectionable, since it has the law backward. Making a privacy-protecting choice increases
a person's Fourth Amendment protection (i.e., his or her reasonable expectation of privacy).
Electing to have a conversation indoors, for instance, results in higher privacy safeguards than
holding the chat in public.
107. When seeking email metadata prospectively, law enforcement officers much more commonly
serve a pen/trap order on the suspect's email service (e.g., Google) and receive a real-time
feed in response. Since this form of email surveillance does not implicate competing Fourth
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the order on the suspect's ISP (e.g., Comcast). They then configure a filtering
device on the ISP's network, which sifts through the suspect's traffic flows, ex-
tracts web browsing and email metadata, and sends back the results.
Applying the Fourth Amendment doctrine for third-party service providers
is not straightforward.as From an absolute perspective, the suspect's web and
email metadata are categorically unprotected, so law enforcement officers may
obtain it without a warrant. From a relative perspective, though, the suspect's
ISP has no legitimate reason for peering into his network traffic. From the ISP's
vantage point, a suspect's web and email metadata could be considered commu-
nications content, since they play no part in routing traffic.' Indeed, when ISPs
have previously conducted "deep packet inspection" on web metadata, they have
been subjected to widespread consumer privacy criticism and to attempted reg-
ulation by the Federal Communications Commission.`0
Lower court opinions on metadata surveillance have tended to favor the ab-
solute perspective, holding that interception of metadata via a communications
carrier is exempt from Fourth Amendment protection, even if those metadata
are intended for processing by another party."' Judicial analysis has emphasized
Amendment perspectives, I focus solely on ISP-based email surveillance. The ISP-based ap-
proach to email surveillance has also become less common owing to the adoption of secure
email transfer and mobile devices.
io8. See Steven M. Bellovin et al., It's Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and
Electronic Surveillance Law, 3o HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016) (describing multiple possible ap-
proaches to the content/metadata distinction); Orin Kerr, Relative vs. Absolute Approaches to
the Content/Metadata Line, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2016, 4:18 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com
/relative-vs-absolute-approaches-contentmetadata-line [http://perma.cc/K2Q7-S2BW].
iog. An ISP need only examine IP addresses (and sometimes domain names) to provide internet
service to a subscriber. What's more, web and email metadata are increasingly encrypted, such
that an ISP cannot examine them.
11o. See, e.g., Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 31 FCC Rcd. 13911 ¶¶ 76, 181-83, 192-93 (2016), nullified by S.J. Res. 34, 115 th Cong.
(2017); see also Peter Whoriskey, Internet Provider Halts Plan To Track, Sell Users' Surfing Data,
WASH. POST (June 25, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2oo8/o6/24/AR2oo8o62401033.html [http://perma.cc/2TNT-X79G] (describing one
cable operator's foray into deep packet inspection and the criticism that followed).
iii. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3 d 5oo, 509-11 ( 9 th Cir. 2008) (email and IP metadata);
In re Application of the United States for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 2005)
(web and IP metadata); United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402, 409 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (web
metadata); [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 58-62 (FISA Ct. [date redacted]) (email
metadata); see also In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-ol, at 32 (FISA Ct. Rev.
Apr. 14, 2016) (analyzing government collection of post-cut-through digits obtained from a
telephone carrier). The analysis in the main text is about whether constitutional protections




that metadata -whether phone, web, or email - are knowingly conveyed to some
third parties. That fact alone is the beginning- and usually the end- of consti-
tutional scrutiny.
The government's preferred doctrinal outcome plausibly draws support
from these cases. The underlying principle is, conceivably, that once a person has
disclosed metadata to some third-party business, it loses all constitutional pro-
tection if obtained through electronic means.
iii. Mobile Phone Serial Numbers
Another line of cases that plausibly supports the government's position re-
lates to mobile phone serial numbers. When police seize a mobile phone, they
must usually obtain a warrant to search the electronic contents.112 On occasion,
officers have removed the back of the phone in order to read printed serial num-
bers. Defendants respond by moving to suppress derivative evidence, arguing
that opening the phone's case constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.
Courts have so far sided with law enforcement on this issue. Reported opin-
ions conclude that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
her mobile phone serial numbers, noting that a serial number is non-content
identifying information." Removing the phone's case to examine that serial
number does not transform the police conduct into a Fourth Amendment search.
Law enforcement hacking, the parallel argument would go, is like removing
a mobile phone's cover. The government is merely setting aside the case - a de
minimis intrusion, and not even a physical intrusion - to obtain constitutionally
unprotected information.
analysis presumes that the metadata is functioning solely as metadata (e.g., for routing com-
munications). A related - but distinct - question is whether the metadata and content catego-
ries are mutually exclusive, or whether metadata can function both as routing information
and as content. On this question, courts have generally held that the metadata and content
categories are not mutually exclusive. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Pri-
vacy Litig., 8o6 F.3 d 125, 135-39 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the distinction between content
and metadata is contextual and reviewing opinions).
112. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480-95 (2014) (implicitly holding that police inspec-
tion of the electronic contents of a mobile phone constitutes a search while declining to permit
warrantless mobile-phone searches incident to arrest).
113. See, e.g., Glenn v. State, No. S17Ao858, 2017 WI. 4582629, at *5 (Ga. Oct. 16, 2017); State v.
Green, 164 So. 3d 331, 344 (La. Ct. App. 2015); infra notes 128-131 (additional cases). But see
State v. Moore, No. 2014-ool669, 2017 WE 3723327, at *6-7 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017)
(Lockemy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing in a divided panel
decision that police removal and analysis of a mobile phone SIM card constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search).
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iv. Payment Card Magnetic Stripes
A fourth line of recent cases that plausibly supports the government's posi-
tion relates to police examination of payment cards. In the typical fact pattern,
officers stumble upon a collection of suspicious payment cards during an unre-
lated traffic stop or arrest. To determine whether the cards are legitimate, the
officers will swipe them through a reader and compare their magnetic stripe
("magstripe") data to the information printed on their faces. When the mag-
stripe and printed data are inconsistent, the officers effectuate an arrest for coun-
terfeit access devices.
The federal courts that have considered these scenarios, including three ap-
pellate panels, have concluded that a law enforcement magstripe swipe does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.114 The opinions reason that the data en-
coded on a magstripe are constitutionally unprotected because they are account
information intended for routine conveyance to third parties (i.e., merchants).
The facts and reasoning of the magstripe cases are arguably analogous to
government hacking to recover a network address. A network address is in-
tended for conveyance to third parties, much like the data on a magnetic stripe.
Hacking to obtain a network address, the argument goes, is merely a long-dis-
tance card swipe.
v. Placing Telephone Calls
A final related scenario, with just a pair of cases on point, involves identifying
the owner of a mobile phone. In these fact patterns, a police officer first recovers
a suspect's mobile phone from a crime scene. Then, to learn the suspect's iden-
tity, the officer places a 911 call and asks the dispatcher for the outbound num-
ber.IS
114. See United States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429 (5 th Cir. 2016); United States v. DE L'Isle, 825 F.3d
426 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Bah, 794 F.3 d 617 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Alabi,
943 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D.N.M. 2013), aff'd, 597 F. App'x 991 (loth Cir. 2015); United States v.
Medina, No. 09-20 7 17 -CR, 2009 WL 3669636 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2009) (Torres, Mag. J.),
adopted in part and rejected in part sub nom. United States v. Duarte, 2009 WL 3669537 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 4, 2009) (excluding the magstripe evidence on other grounds).
115. See State v. Hill, 789 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); see also Cyrus Farivar, Crook Who Left His
Phone at the Scene Has "No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy," ARS TECHNICA (June 23, 2016,
3:24 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2o16/o6/crook-who-left-his-phone-at-the-
scene-has-no-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy [http://perma.cc/8FAS-BQQT] (provid-
ing a partial transcript of the bench ruling in United States v. Muller, No. 2:15-cr-00205-TLN




Both courts to have considered this technique have concluded that it is not a
Fourth Amendment search. One opinion emphasized that the suspect had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone number because it was rou-
tinely disclosed to third-party businesses for call-routing purposes. 116 It was not
of constitutional significance, in the court's view, that the outgoing call was an
investigative step by a police officer rather than a voluntary call placed by the
cellphone's owner. 1
Hacking a computer to learn the owner's identity is quite similar to these
identifying phone calls. In both scenarios, law enforcement investigators compel
a suspect's device to initiate a communication that discloses identifying, non-
content information. If placing an identification call to the government from a
suspect's seized mobile phone does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, then
it is plausible that sending an identifying packet to the government from a sus-
pect's device is also not a constitutional search.
These five lines of cases do lend support to the government's position. But,
critically, it is possible to explain all five lines of cases by applying established
Fourth Amendment principles. At most, these cases are consistent with the gov-
ernment's preferred doctrinal outcome -but they hardly compel that outcome.
Beginning with the mobile phone location cases, lower courts are conclud-
ing, with increasing frequency, that phone location is protected by the Fourth
Amendment" 1 - especially when the government causes a suspect's device to
generate new location information."' Furthermore, five Justices have signaled
that they are prepared to rule in favor of constitutional protection for mobile-
phone location records.12 0 Scholars suggest that the line of cases on which the
government's position relies will be sharply limited-if not eliminated-in the
116. Hill, 789 S.E.2d at 318-20.
117. Id. at 320-21.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, No. 13-cr-oo693-SI-1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25935, at *15-
26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (concluding that historical cell-site location records can be pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, and collecting cases and state statutes).
ig. See supra note 102 (collecting recent cases on cell-site simulators).
120. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and reli-
gious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Govern-
ment might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance
techniques'"); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I conclude that the lengthy
monitoring that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.").
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coming years. 1 In the current term, the Supreme Court is considering Carpenter
v. United States,122 and will directly confront whether mobile-phone location data
are protected by the Fourth Amendment.
But even assuming that the mobile phone location cases are and will remain
good law, those cases are readily explained by the third-party doctrine. Mobile
phone location records are classic third-party business records, exempt from
Fourth Amendment protection. And even when investigators "ping" a suspect's
phone to learn its location, there remains a viable version of the third-party doc-
trine argument. Mobile phones are designed to facilitate location by carriers, for
purposes of providing service, theft tracking, and directing emergency aid. Ping-
ing is nothing more than invoking existing and standard phone functionality
that is intentionally made available to the wireless carrier (i.e., a third-party busi-
ness).
Law enforcement hacking, by contrast, does not involve standard device
functionality. Rather, the very purpose is to subvert the device's ordinary opera-
tion and extract otherwise inaccessible information. The version of the third-
party doctrine that enables warrantless mobile phone tracking has no bearing on
government malware.
Turning to the ISP-based surveillance cases, courts have not yet reevaluated
those rulings in light of recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since the
Warshak opinion in 2010, courts have consistently recognized constitutional pri-
vacy protection for communications content held by third-party businesses.123
To date, no court has grappled with how Warshak applies to ISP-based surveil-
lance. 124
But once again, even assuming that these ISP-based surveillance cases are
good law, they can be readily explained under the third-party doctrine and with-
out implicating logical integrity interests. In these cases, the government accom-
plishes its surveillance via the ISP's equipment, even though the ISP is not the
intended recipient of the surveilled data. In other words, the government obtains
communications metadata from some third-party business. It was not the specific
third party to whom the suspect had conveyed metadata for processing, but it
121. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REv. 311, 313
(2012) ("The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice
majority of the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment
protection.").
122. 819 F.3 d 88o (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
123. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3 d 266, 283-88 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to content stored with a communications service provider).
124. One court has permitted the interception via a telephone carrier of digits dialed after a call has




was still a third party that consensually received the data - rendering it constitu-
tionally unprotected.12 5
Law enforcement hacking to identify a Tor user, by contrast, does not involve
collecting data from any third party who is a consensual recipient.126 That is be-
cause, in Tor's design, a user only consensually discloses their IP address to her
ISP and an individual Tor server; a user does not otherwise consensually disclose
identifiable data to any third party in connection with their online activity.127
The very purpose of law enforcement hacking is to collect that data not from a
third party but from the suspect's own electronic device.
The mobile phone serial number cases are also easy to explain. They, too, are
of questionable vitality: there are just a handful of reported opinions, and the
only federal appellate court to discuss the issue noted that it was a difficult, open
question.128 But even if the cases are correct, they can be readily justified as per-
missible searches incident to arrest,129 inventory searches,o or perhaps even
stop-and-identify practices.
125. This version of the third-party doctrine argument is slightly different from the version that
plausibly permits warrantless mobile phone location tracking. This version centers on
whether the government obtains data via a business that consensually carries the data as a
third-party service provider. The version that applies to mobile phone tracking, by compari-
son, turns on whether the government obtains data via a technical capability that is consen-
sually made available to a third-party service provider. The former argument is fairly similar
to how the third-party doctrine usually applies to communications providers, while the latter
argument is most similar to cases involving file sharing networks (where the suspect has in-
tentionally enabled certain third-party remote access to their device) or law enforcement de-
ception to gain entry onto private property (here the deception is the police posing as the
wireless carrier and the private property is the mobile phone functionality).
126. To be technically precise, the government may leam a suspect Tor user's IP address from com-
munications metadata transmitted by his computer and through his ISP to the government,
rather than from directly querying a software interface on the computer and reporting the
results. But, in either technical design, government malware is the only reason why the com-
munications metadata emanates from the suspect's computer.
127. See generally Dingledine et al., supra note 19 (describing Tor).
128. United States v. Green, 698 F.3 d 48, 53 (ist Cir. 2012) ("The question ... whether the ... re-
trieval of [the defendant's] IMSI number constituted a search . . is not, in our view, an easy
one.").
129. See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 11-205 (JRT/LIB), 2012 WVL 730o8, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Jan.
10, 2012) (concluding that police inspection of a mobile phone's FCC ID number was permis-
sible as a physical search incident to arrest).
130. See United States v. Lowe, No. 2:14-cr-00004-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 5106053, at *11-12 (D. Nev.
Oct. io, 2014).
131. See United States v. Green, No. 09-10183-GAO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157369, at *8-1o (D.
Mass. Jan. 11, 2011), aff'd, Green, 698 F.3 d 48.
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Government hacking does not implicate any of these longstanding Fourth
Amendment doctrines. There is no arrestee, property to inventory, or suspicious
person to identify.
The magstripe opinions can also be explained, in some instances, as permis-
sible searches incident to arrest or inventory searches. There is also a more uni-
versal explanation available: the Fourth Amendment's treatment of contraband
material. A law enforcement technique that solely indicates the presence or ab-
sence of contraband is not a search.132  hen an officer swipes a suspicious card,
she only learns that either (a) the magnetic stripe encodes data identical to the
face of the card (i.e., the card is not contraband) or (b) the card encodes different
data (i.e., the card is contraband). In other words, a magstripe swipe is merely a
contraband search.
Government hacking to obtain identifying information, by contrast, does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment's exception for contraband. There is noth-
ing inherently unlawful about an IP address.
Finally, the pair of cases in which police placed outbound calls are readily
explained by the Fourth Amendment's treatment of abandoned property. In
those cases, the suspects abandoned their mobile phones. When a person dis-
poses of his property, he extinguishes his Fourth Amendment privacy interests
in the property.' Alternatively, those cases may be explained as inventory
searches, where police are making a routine effort to catalog the evidence they
have obtained.13 4
Law enforcement malware does not involve any abandoned property or
property that has already been lawfully seized. In fact, the device that the gov-
ernment hacks often is located in the suspect's own home.
In sum, the government's position- that remotely obtaining data from a de-
vice does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search so long as the data are not
constitutionally protected -is not frivolous. There is a degree of case law sup-
port. But that support is exceedingly thin: every line of cases can be readily ex-
plained without accepting the government's position.
132. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-10 (2005) (sniff test by a trained narcotics dog
during a vehicle stop is not a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 122-26 (1984) (narcotics field test on powder is not a Fourth Amendment search); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (snifftest by a trained narcotics dog at an airport
is not a Fourth Amendment search).
133. E.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628-29 (1991) (rock of cocaine dropped while
fleeing police pursuit); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-44 (1988) (garbage placed
outside the home); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924) (illegal whiskey bottle
abandoned during police pursuit); see also Farivar, supra note 115.
134. E.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-48 (1983) (inventory search of an arrestee's bag);





b. A Better Position: The Fourth Amendment Protects Logical Integrity
A superior rule for the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement hacking
holds that any infringement of logical integrity constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search. This Section locates support for the rule in the Supreme Court's seminal
Katz v. United States opinion; the Court's recently articulated concern for elec-
tronic devices in Riley v. California; lower court cases on cloud service searches;
the consent-based underpinnings of the third-party doctrine; and normative
considerations. The logical integrity rule has a far stronger basis in doctrine, the-
ory, and policy than the government's preferred outcome.
i. Katz v. United States
The modern history of the Fourth Amendment derives from the recognition
that information privacy interests are not coextensive with physical barriers. Katz
established that a property interest is neither necessary nor sufficient for consti-
tutional privacy protection; to return again to Justice Stewart's famed turn of
phrase, the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.""'
The government's proposed rule would draw a sharp distinction between
breaches of physical integrity to obtain constitutionally unprotected data and
breaches of logical integrity to obtain the same data; the former would neces-
sarily constitute a Fourth Amendment search, while the latter would not. This
distinction is inconsistent with Katz's core principle that physical spaces should
not be the yardstick for Fourth Amendment interests.
Another principle from Katz suggests that any infringement of logical integ-
rity is a Fourth Amendment search. The Katz Court explained that constitutional
privacy interests are defined by an individual's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. Conveniently, the contours of a device's logical integrity are typically also
coextensive with privacy expectations. As discussed in Section I.A.2 above, mod-
ern software security is usually implemented via application sandboxing. The
very purpose of a sandbox is to conform to and calibrate users' expectations
about security and privacy. So, a breach of a device's logical integrity - by break-
ing out of a software sandbox-is necessarily a Fourth Amendment search under
the Katz standard.
ii. Riley v. California
The Supreme Court's more recent guidance in Riley also favors treating all
breaches of logical integrity as Fourth Amendment searches. As many scholars
135. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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and courts have acknowledged, Riley demands a higher level of concern when
law enforcement officers interact with a suspect's electronic device as opposed to
a conventional closed container. As several commenters have put it, Riley means
that "digital is different."13 6
The government's proposed rule effectively ignores the rationale behind Ri-
ley. On its account, physically interacting with a device would constitute a search,
but remotely accessing the processing and storage of that same device - precisely
what caused the Court to sound a privacy alarm in Riley - would not implicate
the Fourth Amendment.
This Article's proposed rule, by contrast, is entirely consistent with Riley.
Whether a breach of integrity is physical or logical, law enforcement would be
required to comply with Fourth Amendment safeguards.
iii. Cloud Service Searches and United States v. Warshak
In its landmark Warshak opinion, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that an email
account is the virtual equivalent of a hotel room or an apartment."' A breach of
the account is a Fourth Amendment search, much like a breach of a physical
space. In the years following Warshak, other circuits have cited the opinion with
approval, and dozens of lower courts have followed the ruling.' The Depart-
ment of Justice implemented Warshak as nationwide policy, and the House of
Representatives has twice unanimously voted to enact legislation that would
codify Warshak. "'
Assuming that Warshak was rightly decided as a matter of positive law, which
seems beyond question at this stage, and assuming that the physical space anal-
ogy is holding rather than dicta, which it certainly appears to be, then the Fourth
Amendment necessarily protects the logical integrity of a person's data stored
136. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489-91 (2014) (comparing electronic device searches to
physical searches and concluding that the former implicate substantially greater privacy inter-
ests); see also Jennifer Granick, SCOTUS & Cell Phone Searches: Digital Is Different, JUST SE-
cuRiTY (June 25, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12219/scotus-cell-phone-searches
-digital [http://perma.cc/94RH-42EV] (arguing that Riley stands for a Fourth Amendment
principle of greater protection for electronic information); Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley,
WASH. PosT: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/o6/25/the-significance-of-riley [http://perma.cc/Y3G3
-W4YB] (providing a similar analysis).
137. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3 d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010).
138. See supra note 74 (discussing Warshak and its aftermath).
139. See Email PrivacyAct, H.R. 387, 115 th Cong. (2017); Email PrivacyAct, H.R. 699, 114 th Cong.




with a service provider. 140 If a person can establish a constitutionally protected
logical integrity interest in a third-party business's data center, then surely she
can establish a logical integrity interest in her own data stored on her own com-
puter at her own home. In other words, accepting the Warshak opinion means
accepting the logic of logical integrity interests and accepting that government
hacking is necessarily a Fourth Amendment search.
iv. The Consent-Based Limiting Principle for Constitutional
Information Privacy
The early cases limiting Fourth Amendment information privacy arose from
police informants. In Hoffa v. United States, the Supreme Court held that there is
no Fourth Amendment protection for a suspect's statements to an informant.14 1
In United States v. White, the Court went a small step further, and concluded that
there is no constitutional privacy interest in statements electronically transmitted
by an informant.142
Hoffa and White were followed by a pair of cases involving surveillance via
businesses. In United States v. Miller, the Court decided that law enforcement
access to bank records does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 143in
Smith v. Maryland, the Court reached the same conclusion for law enforcement
access to telephone records.144
The final pair of cases limiting information privacy related to physical loca-
tion. In United States v. Knotts, the Court reasoned that there is no Fourth
Amendment protection for a person's public movements.145 The next year, in
United States v. Karo, the Court found a cognizable information privacy interest
in a person's location at home.146
Courts and scholars have mixed and matched these six Supreme Court cases
that limit Fourth Amendment information privacy into a variety of doctrinal for-
mulations, including the "third-party doctrine," the "metadata doctrine," and the
140. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306 (loth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (discussing
the application of Warshak and noting that "no one before us disputes that an email is a virtual
container").
141. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
142. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
143. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
144. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
145. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
146. 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding "monitoring of a beeper in a private residence" to be a
Fourth Amendment violation).
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"public movements doctrine." Whatever the terminology, the underlying princi-
ple is the same: the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that a sus-
pect voluntarily discloses to a third party or the public, as long as the government
obtains the information from the intended recipient of the information. As Orin
Kerr has explained, the limiting principle of constitutional information privacy
is grounded in consent: under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, a person
cannot reasonably expect privacy in information that he intentionally discloses,
because the recipient of the information could be (functionally) a police inform-
ant. 147
Law enforcement hacking flunks the Fourth Amendment's limiting princi-
ple. First, government malware does not involve voluntary disclosure. While law
enforcement hacking often begins with a consensual act (the suspect clicks a link
or visits a website), the very purpose of hacking is to exceed the scope of that
consent, circumvent security and privacy protections, and force a suspect's device
to disgorge information. 148 Second, hacking does not involve obtaining infor-
mation from an intended recipient. The sole reason that the government receives
data from the suspect's device is that the government's own software sends the
data.
147. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561, 588-90 (2009).
148. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-52 (1991) (describing the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment consent). Several appellate courts have recognized a "consent once removed" exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, where initial consent to a law enforcement
entry transfers to immediately subsequent law enforcement entry. See Callahan v. Millard
County, 494 F.3d 891, 895-98 (loth Cir. 2007), revd on other grounds sub nom. Pearson v. Cal-
lahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9 th Cit. 1996);
United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F-3d 852, 855-56 (7 th Cit. 1995). Whatever the vitality of the
consent-once-removed doctrine, it does not provide a basis for warrantless law enforcement
hacking. First, a suspect's consent once removed has the same scope as the suspect's initial
consent. See, e.g., Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1478-79 ("When entering pursuant to the suspect's 'con-
sent once removed, the additional backup officers are restricted to the scope of the consent
originally given. Our holding does not authorize police to go beyond those areas consented to
or to conduct general searches without first satisfying the ordinary requirements of consent,
a warrant, or exigent circumstances which excuse the failure to obtain a warrant." (citations
omitted)). Second, the consent-once-removed exception only allows for a subsequent entry
to effectuate a warrantless arrest; any additional warrantless search or seizure must be justified
by a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v.






There are also policy reasons to favor recognizing Fourth Amendment pro-
tection in cases involving remote access to metadata. Imposing an across-the-
board warrant requirement for government malware avoids a foreseeable doctri-
nal morass about when, exactly, the Fourth Amendment kicks in. 149 The alter-
native would require courts to carefully divvy up a computer's (virtual) innards,
holding various parts to be within or outside the scope of constitutional privacy
safeguards.so
A warrant mandate also increases uniformity and predictability for law en-
forcement agencies. Rather than haggling with attorneys and scrutinizing local
case law, officers can get started right away with drafting affidavits. Uniformity
is especially critical for the government's watering hole delivery strategy, where
one warrant in one district must be consistent with Fourth Amendment doctrine
nationwide.
The limited burden on law enforcement also weighs in favor of a strict war-
rant requirement. A warrant requirement is not much of a hurdle in the context
of government malware."' By the time investigators have singled out a target
computer system or user, they should have ample factual basis to substantiate
probable cause.152
Finally, imposing a warrant requirement on all law enforcement hacking
avoids a foreseeable Fourth Amendment parade of horribles. The Supreme
Court has clearly held that there is no constitutional privacy interest in contra-
band material.' What happens if the government widely distributes malware
that only reports back in the presence of unlawful material, such as illegally cop-
ied music files? Are we prepared for a society in which, at the press of a button,
the government could constitutionally hack and identify millions of Americans
149. Cf United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411-13 (2012) (articulating a doctrinal preference
against "thorny" Fourth Amendment search problems).
150. Cf Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (arguing against ambiguous line-drawing
exercises for various types of digital files contained on a device).
151. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] (Dec. 8, 2004), in 1 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra
note 93, at 5 ("Until a policy or directive is put in place, [the Data Intercept Technology Unit]
has and will support any case that obtains a search warrant. Over the last six months it has
not proven to be an obstacle to investigations.").
152. See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance ofJustification Standards,
94 MINN. L. REv. 1514, 1535-42 (2010) (arguing that probable cause develops early in online
investigations); see also infra Section II.B (discussing the application of Fourth Amendment
requirements to searches where a particular computer cannot be identified in advance).
153. See sources cited supra note 132.
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who have committed mundane misdemeanors? This is no thought experiment:
the technology is straightforward and exists today.154 Imposing an across-the-
board warrant requirement serves as a counterbalance against the vast body of
criminal law and as a backstop against sweeping prosecutorial discretion.
As between the two options for reconciling Fourth Amendment information
privacy doctrine, the choice is plain. Courts should end their myopic focus on
which data government malware retrieves and acknowledge that government
hacking necessarily constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. By design, govern-
ment malware's exploitation phase breaches the integrity of a device. Thus, re-
gardless of the specific data that government malware reports, agents must pre-
sumptively obtain a warrant.
II. RULES FOR MALWARE
This Part continues the positive law inquiry, leveraging the analysis and tech-
nical framework from Part I to solve a set of procedural puzzles grounded in the
Fourth Amendment, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Mag-
istrates Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Sections assess
when government access becomes a search and presumptively requires a warrant
(Section A), how the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and particularity re-
quirements apply (Section B), the proper venue for issuing a warrant (Section
C), how long the search lasts (Section D), when and how the government must
notify device owners (Section E), and when the government must satisfy height-
ened super-warrant requirements (Section F). The conclusion of the Part (Sec-
tion G) advocates for a consistent application of super-warrant requirements to
government hacking.
154. An easy technical implementation of this investigative technique would be to generate a set of
signatures for known contraband files, then check each file on a hacked device for whether the
signature matches. A family of mathematical algorithms dubbed "cryptographic hashing" en-
ables quickly computing these file signatures. See Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment
Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 HARv. L. REv. F. 38, 43-46 (20o6) (arguing that an ex-
amination of a seized device for file hashes that match known contraband would not consti-
tute a Fourth Amendment search); see also Note, Data Mining, Dog Snmffs, and the Fourth





A. Initiating a Search
At what stage of operation does a government malware deployment become
a Fourth Amendment search? In some scenarios, the first stage - delivery-will
trigger Fourth Amendment safeguards. If government agents sneak into a sus-
pect's home or private office to install malware, for instance, they have unambig-
uously intruded into a constitutionally protected area.' Similarly, if investiga-
tors plug a flash drive into a suspect's device, that would constitute a search.156
In general, though, the delivery phase will not trigger constitutional privacy pro-
tections because law enforcement officers have broad discretion to engage in de-
ception.1 7 The delivery stage of a phishing attack is roughly akin to tricking a
suspect into opening a letter, and the delivery stage of a watering hole attack is
approximately equivalent to slipping an insert into a suspect's mail.' Neither
practice would trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
The exploitation step is more complicated. For decades, courts have strug-
gled to define what constitutes "hacking" into or "unauthorized access" to a com-
puter system. Under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and
parallel state statutes, the judiciary and scholars have developed at least seven
distinct substantive tests."' While there is no end in sight for debate over the
155. See Payton v. Riddick, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (noting that the "physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed") (quoting
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). The government has previously
applied for hacking warrants where the delivery stage involves entry into the suspect's home
or private office. E.g., United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR1o 7, 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (D.
Neb. Aug. 5, 2016) (describing a search warrant that authorized entering a suspect's home and
installing malware); Order at 3-6, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Surreptitious Entry into the Premises of Merchant Servs., No. 99-4061 (D.N.J. June 9, 1999)
(search warrant allowing surreptitious entry to a suspect's private office to install malware).
156. See supra Section I.B.1.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 4 3 2, 434-35 (9 th Cir. 1993) (reviewing
doctrine permitting law enforcement deception to gain entry to a suspect's home). But see
United States v. Phua, 1oo F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1047-52 (D. Nev. 2015) (describing limits on the
government's ability to use deception, including where the government manufactures an exi-
gency).
is8. Continuing with the mail analogy, while phishing and watering hole delivery techniques are
akin to a suspect consensually accepting a deceptive parcel sent by the government, the ex-
ploitation and execution steps are more analogous to a robot nonconsensually slipping out of
the parcel and roving about the suspect's home.
159. See Jonathan Mayer, The "Narrow" Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A User
Guide for Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1644, 1645-46, 1656-57
(2016) (synthesizing substantive standards for authorization to access a computer system or
information). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act explicitly excepts law enforcement inves-
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proper scope of computer crime liability, there is one point of consensus: when
a person circumvents a technical safeguard on a computer system, that consti-
tutes a violation. 16 0
The circumvention test functions as a tidy translation for established Fourth
Amendment doctrine. When law enforcement officers break into a home, by-
passing physical security measures (like doors and locks), they effectuate a
Fourth Amendment search. Similarly, when government agents break into a
computer, circumventing technical protections (like sandboxing), they trigger
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
This analysis applies beyond government malware that identifies Tor users.
As a rule of thumb, government software that actively probes a consumer device
will constitute a search. That is because consumer devices, unlike business serv-
ers, are usually configured to be private. 161 When government software is merely
responding to an ordinary request from a consumer device, by contrast - such as
when a person visits a government website - that will rarely constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.
There are exceptions to this rule, to be sure. Consumer devices can advertise
information to the public, such as on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network. When
government software communicates with a consumer device under those cir-
cumstances, there plainly is no breach of physical or logical integrity. Law en-
forcement may obtain data without first seeking a warrant. 162
tigations from its regulatory scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2012) ("This section does not pro-
hibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforce-
ment agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelli-
gence agency of the United States.").
16o. See Mayer, supra note 159, at 1656-57, 1662.
161. When the government remotely probes a business server, much more difficult line-drawing
questions can arise. While investigating an online black market, for instance, federal investi-
gators may have engaged in borderline hacking conduct. See Nik Cubrilovic, Analyzing the
FBI's Explanation of How They Located Silk Road, NEW WEB ORD. (Sept. 7, 2014),
https://www.nikcub.com/posts/analyzing-fbi-explanation-silk-road [http://perma.cc/E3K3
-4 XPX] (collecting and technically analyzing government filings associated with locating the
black market server). Some remote investigative practices involving business servers do re-
main easily identifiable as searches, such as entering a user's cloud service account without
their permission. See Memorandum from David Bitkower, supra note 92, at 5 (offering a gov-
ernment hacking scenario where investigators cannot serve a Stored Communications Act
warrant on a service provider, so they log into the suspect's account themselves).
162. Courts have, for instance, consistently concluded that government investigators may explore
public file-sharing services without triggering Fourth Amendment safeguards. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hill, 750 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3 d 1117,
1127 ( 9 th Cir. 2008); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205 (1oth Cir. 2008); see also
United States v. King, 509 F.3 d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding no search when the




Critically, this exemption for advertised data only applies to information
made available on public networks. If the police obtain advertised data by intrud-
ing into a private network- even an unprotected wireless network- they are
conducting a search and must usually obtain a warrant.163 Moreover, if officers
intercept advertised data on a private network in real time, they are operating a
wiretap and must obtain a super-warrant.16 4
Another (possible) exception of government remote access that does not
constitute a search is when the government activates preexisting device function-
ality that is partially controlled by a third-party business. For example, as dis-
cussed earlier, wireless carriers have the capability to remotely enable location
reporting from a subscriber's device.16 5 This functionality is required on mobile
phones, does not involve bypassing any security safeguards, does not include
delivering proprietary government software, and does not require entering into
any user storage area. But this capability is reserved for extraordinary circum-
stances, assuredly runs counter to a device user's privacy expectations, and in-
volves tampering with device configuration solely for the government's bene-
fit. 166
Reasonable minds can disagree on how to apply the circumvention test (or
other computer crime tests) in this scenario, and whether these facts should be
considered a Fourth Amendment search or an instance of malware. Whatever
the resolution, this much is certain: only a small subset of device functionality is
remotely available to third parties. These fact patterns are readily distinguishable
from most configurations of government malware.
early interagency report on computer searches also recognized a distinction between publicly
and privately advertised data. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS WORKING
GRP., supra note 96, at 20 (suggesting that using the public Unix "finger" command to collect
identifying information would not constitute a search, but "exploiting design flaws" to collect
the same information would be a search).
163. See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL 179326, at *6-8 (D. Or. Jan.
17, 2013) (invalidating the warrantless search of an unprotected wireless network). In some
scenarios, the police may be able to obtain consent from a person with authorized access to
the private network. See United States v. Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355-57 (N.D. Ohio
2011).
164. See Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920, 926-36 (9 th Cir. 2013) (applying the Wiretap Act to
real-time content interception from unprotected wireless networks).
165. See FCC Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, So Fed. Reg. 11,806 (Mar. 4, 2015)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Pt. 20) (discussing the location capabilities of mobile phones and
setting new accuracy requirements).
166. Cf In re U.S. Order Authorizing Roving Interception, 349 F.3d 1132, 1133-35 ( 9 th Cir. 2003)
(applying the Wiretap Act to remote FBI activation of a car's built-in microphone using theft-
tracking functionality).
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A third possible exception worth mentioning, since it has been raised by both
FBI agents and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, is de-
ployment of malware against computer trespassers. 16 7 (In policy circles, this
practice is often dubbed "hack back.") Courts have held that intentional trespass-
ers on real property may not be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for
their personal property. 168 Similarly, the Wiretap Act allows for warrantless sur-
veillance of communications to or from a computer trespasser, so long as the
owner of the attacked computer system consents.16 9 The recent Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act expanded that permission, such that network and sys-
tem providers can now monitor all computer trespasser activity that transits their
networks or systems. 170
Courts should decline to recognize a trespasser exception for government
malware. For starters, reliance on the physical trespass analogy is factually
flawed. A hacker has in no way placed the entirety of her own device "into" the
system that they are hacking. Rather, she has selectively sent data to (and re-
ceived data from) a victim computer.
167. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Criminal Rules Meeting, JUD. CONF. U.S.
lo (Apr. 7-8, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/ad-
visory-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-april-2o14 [http://perma.cc/7GNJ-MFRP];
Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] (July 2,2007,10:52 AM), in 8 ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND.,
CIPAV FOIA RELEASE 29, https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi-cipav-o8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8TDK-C2W5] ("It is just not well settled in the law that we can rely on the
trespasser exception to the search requirement.").
168. See Luke M. Milligan, Note, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers: Searching for the Le-
gitimacy of the Government-Notification Doctrine, So EMORY L.J. 1357, 1367-74 (2001) (summa-
rizing the state of Fourth Amendment doctrine involving physical trespassers).
169. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(21) & 2511(2)(i) (2012); Comput. Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section,
Criminal Div., Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 177-79 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/ol/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ZLW-QYQJ] (ex-
plaining the computer trespasser exception to the Wiretap Act).
170. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 104, 129 Stat. 2936, 2940-41




Furthermore, the physical trespass cases involve temporarily abandoned per-
sonal property."' And even in those fact patterns, courts have sometimes recog-
nized Fourth Amendment protections.17 2 A hacker has not, in any sense, aban-
doned the integrity or contents of her computer. With high probability, in fact,
the computer remains at the hacker's home or on her person.
A direct application of the Katz test also cuts against recognizing a trespasser
exception. A hacker has not manifested a diminished expectation of privacy in
her own computer by breaking into someone else's computer." Using personal
property in the commission of a crime does not, by itself, negate Fourth Amend-
ment protection. (If the law were otherwise, the unbroken line of closed-con-
tainer cases would be erroneous.)
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Riley disfavors a trespasser
exception. Modern technology contains data of extraordinary volume, duration,
pervasiveness, and sensitivity.174 That recognition weighs heavily in favor of a
warrant requirement. A trespasser exception would allow the government to
"hack back" and obtain a wealth of information, much of it not immediately re-
lated to defending the computer system under attack.1 75
Assuming that courts reject a trespasser exception, the resulting rules are
straightforward. With a victim's consent, investigators may intercept infor-
mation sent to or received by a hacker 176 and may monitor data advertised by the
171. If a person has a closed container under his or her immediate control, the Fourth Amendment
applies. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 n.1o (1984) (noting that, even in an
entirely public area, Fourth Amendment protection remains for "effects upon the person").
172. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152-61 (Conn. 1991) (concluding that a trespasser had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed duffel bag and cardboard box that he had aban-
doned).
173. Cf Sam Zeitlin, Note, Botnet Takedowns and the Fourth Amendment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 746,
770-77 (2015) (concluding that if the government obtains information from a compromised
"zombie" computer that is part of a "botnet," it is conducting a Fourth Amendment search).
If anything, it seems reasonably likely that a hacker would have installed additional security
precautions, developing a stronger argument for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
174. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-91 (2014) (discussing ways in which the search
of a mobile phone is far more intrusive than a physical search).
175. A narrower trespasser exception, allowing the government solely to take steps to prevent an
attack or identify the perpetrator, would mitigate this concern. But a narrower exception
would have no doctrinal basis, and would require courts to rigorously parse and review each
and every category of information that the government obtained.
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i) (2012) (allowing communications content interception against a
computer trespasser, with a victim's consent).
619
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
hacker on the victim's network.1 7 7 But the moment investigators break into the
hacker's computer, they are conducting a search and must ordinarily obtain a
warrant.1 7 8
B. Probable Cause and Particularity
The Fourth Amendment imposes two substantive constraints on a search
warrant application: officers must demonstrate probable cause that they will find
evidence of a crime, and they must describe that evidence with particularity.1 79
These two requirements are deeply intertwined: particularity determines the
scope of probable cause, linking it to a specific offense and type of evidence.
Courts are already struggling with how probable cause and particularity ap-
ply to the information that government agents collect from a suspect's device or
177. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F-3 d 114, 119-24 (3d Cit. 2014) (holding that a network tres-
passer does not have a Fourth Amendment interest in his or her network configuration as
exposed to the victim's network, but rejecting the argument that all information associated
with the trespasser is exempt from protection).
178. As with all Fourth Amendment searches, exigent circumstances may excuse the warrant re-
quirement. The Supreme Court has noted that these are highly fact-specific determinations,
and require extraordinary justification. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (listing bomb detonation
and child abduction as hypothetical exigencies where a warrantless mobile phone search
might be permissible). The rationale most likely to be applicable to computer trespassers is
destruction of evidence, since most electronic attacks do not implicate human life or safety.
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (noting various exigencies that excuse a search
warrant). In order for that justification to apply, though, investigators must have reasonable
grounds to believe that the hacker is destroying evidence in his or her own computer system.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Our decisions in re-
lated contexts have held that ambiguous conduct cannot form the basis for a belief of the
officers that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted."). While it is con-
ceivable that some hackers will satisfy this standard - for instance, by issuing specific taunts -
investigators will rarely have sufficient indicia that a hacker plans to purge data from his or
her own computer. See United States v. Gorshkov, No. CRoo-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *4
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) (concluding in dicta that an exigency justified the warrantless
remote copying of a hacking group's data, because the FBI had just arrested two of the hackers
and co-conspirators could delete the data). What's more, even if an exigency justifies war-
rantless remote copying of data, investigators will usually have time to obtain a warrant au-
thorizing examination of the data. See id. (noting that investigators obtained a warrant before
examining the remotely-seized hacker data).
179. To be precise, a search warrant can also be directed at the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967). I focus on evidentiary searches because




cloud service account. Some courts have required ex ante search protocols, de-
lineating particular pockets of stored data and methods for examining them.8 0
Others have allowed broad discretion for investigators, checked solely by ex post
suppression motions."' In the author's view, given the extraordinary quantity
and sensitivity of data stored in electronic devices and the haziness of ex post
suppression practice, ex ante restrictions are the better approach.
Law enforcement malware poses these same general problems, and intro-
duces one more: the government may not know which device it is hacking. When
deploying identification malware, the very purpose is to discover a computer's
location and owner. The result is a seeming chicken-and-egg problem: how can
investigators describe, with particularity, the very electronic device that they are
attempting to discover?
The solution lies in the doctrine of "anticipatory" warrants.18 2 Courts have
long allowed for law enforcement searches and arrests subject to defined condi-
tions that trigger the warrant's execution.' The notion is that courts can iden-
tify facts in advance that are likely to occur and that would satisfy probable cause
18o. See, e.g., United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918-22 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (invalidating a
smartphone search warrant that covered "any or all files contained on said phone" as insuffi-
ciently particularized); In re [Redacted] @gmail.com, 62. F. Supp. 3d ioo, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (suggesting that, at minimum, the government must identify date restrictions and com-
mit to returning or destroying relevant evidence in a cloud service search); In re Search of
Info. Associated with [Redacted] @mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-9 (D.D.C. 2014) (calling for
online services to prescreen information made available to the government, according to spe-
cific times, keywords, parties, or other filtering criteria).
181. See, e.g., In re aWarrant for xxxxxxx@gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 396-401 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that, in general, ex ante protocols for data searches are not required to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment's particularity standard).
182. Anticipatory warrants offer a comprehensive and coherent constitutional basis for identifica-
tion malware. There are, to be sure, related lines of doctrine that could also be used to justify
identification-malware warrants. Courts have long permitted location-tracking warrants,
even though at the time of issuance officers do not know where the suspect will travel. See
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984). More recently, courts have allowed DNA-
based "John Doe" arrest warrants, where officers do not know the suspect's identity at the
time of issuance. See People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 71-76 (Cal. 2010).
183. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96 (20o6) ("Anticipatory warrants are, therefore,
no different in principle from ordinary warrants. They require the magistrate to determine
(1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be on the
described premises (3) when the warrant is executed."); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699,
702-04 (2d Cit. 1989) (reviewing the doctrine, policy, and precedent that support anticipatory
warrants).
621
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and particularity once they do occur.184 Government agents then wait for the
specified triggering conditions and execute their warrant.
Controlled package delivery is the quintessential example of an anticipatory
warrant.185 Courts have consistently upheld search and arrest warrants condi-
tioned upon receipt of a contraband parcel. In these scenarios, officers do not
necessarily know in advance when the package will be accepted. They may not
even know who will receive the package or where it will be delivered.186 But it is
likely that someone will accept the parcel, and accepting the parcel is a sufficient
triggering condition to establish probable cause and particularity to both search
the place of delivery and arrest the recipient.
Wiretaps are another established area of permissible anticipatory searches.
When seeking a "roving" super-warrant, investigators do not know in advance
which places they will bug or which phone lines they will tap.1' Courts have
nevertheless sustained these investigatory practices, emphasizing that the touch-
stone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable particularity, not exacting preci-
sion.
184. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96-97 (explaining that an anticipatory warrant requires probable cause
both with respect to the triggering condition occurring and to finding evidence once the trig-
gering condition is satisfied). In a controlled-delivery scenario, probable cause with respect
to the triggering condition is easily satisfied-packages are usually delivered to their intended
destination and recipient.
185. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03 (collecting cases); Joshua D. Poyer, Note, United States v. Mig-
gins: A Survey of Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Need for Uniformity Among the Circuits,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 701, 745-49 (2004) (noting variations in the requirements among cir-
cuits).
186. In the usual controlled-delivery fact pattern, investigators at least know the intended recipient
and destination for a package. With a malware search, by contrast, officers cannot provide a
name or address in advance. While that sort of ex ante ambiguity is rare in a controlled deliv-
ery, it has come up, and courts have sustained anticipatory warrants for unspecified addresses
and individuals. See People v. Bui, 885 N.E.2d 506, 517-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (sustaining a
controlled-delivery search warrant for "any other location" where a package was taken); State
v. Morris, 668 P.2d 857, 861-63 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (sustaining a controlled-delivery search
warrant for "whoever picks up said package" and "wherever the described package is taken").
187. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95-96 (noting that wiretap super-warrants are a type of anticipatory
warrant).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (2012) (laying out procedures for roving wiretaps and bugs).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1122-25 (2d Cir. 1993) (roving bug); United
States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1443-45 (9 th Cir. 1992) (roving wiretap); see also Grubbs, 547
U.S. at 97 ("The Fourth Amendment, however, does not set forth some general 'particularity
requirement.' It specifies only two matters that must be 'particularly describ [ed]' in the war-




Government hacking follows the same principles as a controlled delivery or
a roving wiretap. Agents may not know in advance the exact computer that they
are breaching. But they can articulate a conditional set of facts to ensure a fair
chance that their malware will be delivered and that its recipient will be a com-
puter system that satisfies probable cause and particularity.
One possible malware trigger is affirmative conduct by a suspect. The FBI's
"phishing" attack in the Timberline case is a good example. 10 The target was
actively using his social media account, so it was likely that an FBI message
would be read. And, given the target's apparent ego, it was very likely that he
would click the FBI's bogus news link. Whoever first clicked that link was likely
to be the person sending bomb threats, because he had demonstrated control
over the social media account. And it was likely that his computer contained ev-
idence of his crimes and identifying information. In more precise Fourth
Amendment terminology: there was probable cause that the FBI's malware
would be delivered to a particular computer, and there was probable cause that
particular criminal evidence would be recovered from that computer.
This phishing approach is not foolproof, to be sure. The government must
make sure it delivers malware to the right account. On at least one occasion, FBI
agents mistakenly requested a warrant to send malware to the wrong email ad-
dress."' Investigators must also take precautions to limit the likelihood of hack-
ing innocent users; given that links can easily be forwarded or indexed by a
search engine, probable cause will quickly dissipate after a phishing attempt.1 92
Restricting malware delivery to the first device to visit the phishing link, for in-
stance, might be appropriate. But, in general, using phishing as an anticipatory
warrant condition is a constitutionally sound investigative strategy.
Another possible approach to anticipatory warrants is conditioning malware
delivery on when the target visits a specific webpage. On at least two occasions,
190. See supra notes 2-29 and accompanying text.
191. Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 37, at 3.
192. See Memorandum from Nathan F. Wessler et al., Speech, Privacy & Tech. Project, Am. Civil
Liberties Union, to Members of the Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules 13-14 (Apr. 4, 2014)
(on file with author) (describing ways in which a government phishing attack could reach
innocent parties).
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the FBI has seized an online service and sent identification malware to all visi-
tors." This type of watering hole attack has proven exceedingly controversial,
since it can involve hacking thousands of users under just one search warrant.194
Using a watering hole trigger for government malware can sometimes be
constitutionally sustainable. Authorizing multiple searches under one warrant is
no issue: courts have consistently permitted that practice. 95 A warrant under the
Fourth Amendment requires valid judicial determinations, not formally format-
ted paperwork.1 96
The challenge is establishing probable cause of a crime and describing evi-
dence with particularity based solely on a visit to a webpage. It is only possible
to make that determination in cases involving child pornography, because the
criminal statutes on child pornography are exceptionally broad and because the
speech protections for child pornography are exceptionally limited. Possessing
information, or attempting to possess information, is rarely itself a crime. Child
pornography is unique: merely possessing it or attempting to possess it is crim-
inal, and the First Amendment allows for this broad criminalization. 97
From a Fourth Amendment perspective, then, if a user visits a semi-private
website that is exclusively dedicated to distributing child pornography, there is
probable cause to believe that the user has committed a crime (attempted pos-
session), and that the user's particular computer contains particular evidence of
193. Application for "Bulletin Board A" Search Warrant, supra note 41, at 30 ("I request authority to
use the NIT to investigate: (1) any user who accesses any page in the 'Images' section of 'Bul-
letin Board A' . . . ."); Poulsen, supra note 42.
194. See Memorandum from Nathan F. Wessler et al., supra note 192, at 14-15 (criticizing watering
hole techniques).
195. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Propriety and Legality ofIssuing Only One Search Warrant To
Search More than One Place or Premises Occupied by Same Person, 31 A.L.R.2d 864 (1953) (col-
lecting cases that have permitted searches of multiple locations with a single warrant).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR o8-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *18-
19 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013) (explaining that a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance need
not be a "model of clarity" and need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment's basic requirements
of a neutral and disinterested magistrate, probable cause, and particularity). As a matter of
policy, greater clarity in warrant documentation is certainly preferable, but not a constitutional
requirement.
197. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2252A (2012); United States v. Williams, 533 U.S. 285, 292-304 (2008)
(holding that an offer to provide or request to receive child pornography is categorically un-
protected by the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753-74 (1982) (holding





that crime (identifying information). The government relies upon this very rea-
soning in its watering hole deployments."'
Most websites, though, serve multiple purposes and are open to the public.
The government may need to impose extra conditions on its watering hole de-
livery to ensure probable cause. Merely visiting the site is insufficient; waiting
for a user to log in or send a private message, for instance, would offer firmer
footing. Prior watering hole warrants have involved each of these conditions."
As with phishing, it appears that the government does not always correctly
execute this strategy for developing probable cause. In a highly publicized epi-
sode, the FBI appears to have seized a set of webservers and deployed malware
to anyone visiting any of the hosted websites.2 00 Some of the websites were ded-
icated to child pornography, such that probable cause may have existed for each
visitor to those sites. But many of the websites hosted information that was not
criminal and could not be criminal under the First Amendment, rendering the
FBI's hacking of visitors constitutionally infirm.
C. Venue
When investigators intend to apply for a hacking warrant, which courthouse
should they go to? Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal
Magistrates Act establish geographic limitations on which court may issue a
hacking warrant.
The venue provisions in Rule 41 that predate the recent rise in government
hacking are reasonably clear. A federal magistrate judge has authority to issue
search warrants for property within her district.20 1 A magistrate can also issue a
warrant for property outside her district, but only in exceptional circumstances.
Until recently, those circumstances were: property currently within the district
that might move outside the district, terrorism investigations, tracking device
198. See, e.g., Application for "Bulletin Board A" Search Warrant, supra note 41, at 30.
199. Affidavit of FBI Special Agent John Robertson in Support of Application for a Search Warrant
at 12, No. 1:15-mj-00534-VVP (E.D.N.Y. June io, 2015) (describing a warrant that authorized
malware delivery from a seized child pornography website "each time any user or administra-
tor logged [in]"); Application for "Bulletin Board A" Search Warrant, supra note 41, at 30 ("I
request authority to use the NIT to investigate: . . . (2) any user who sends or views a private
message on 'Bulletin Board A' during the period of this authorization.").
200. Poulsen, supra note 42.
201. FED. R. CluM. P. 4 1(b)(1); see Owsley, supra note 28, at 320-23 (reviewing applicable venue
provisions).
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installation within the district, and crimes committed on certain federal prop-
erty.202 Law enforcement hacking across state lines usually was not covered-
even when the government had no way of knowing the target device's location,
such as when the suspect was a Tor user.203
The Department of Justice, understandably, sought an amendment to Rule
41 that would permit extra-district hacking warrants where the location of the
search is unknown.20 4 The amendment became effective on December 1, 2016,
and it resolves the venue puzzle under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.20 5 If the government knows the location of the device it is hacking, inves-
tigators usually must apply to a judge in the district where the device is lo-
cated.2 06 If the government does not know the location of the device, because it
has been "concealed through technological means," investigators can apply to a
judge in "any district where activities related to [the] crime may have oc-
curred."207
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(b)(2)-(5).
203. The previous result under Rule 41 was that when the government knew which computer it
was hacking, investigators would apply to a magistrate judge in the district where the com-
puter was located. When the government was hacking a computer in a terrorism-related case,
a magistrate in any district would suffice. But when the government wanted to hack a com-
puter and did not know where the computer was located (e.g., when investigating a Tor user),
a substantial majority of lower courts rightly concluded that there was no exceptional Rule 41
venue provision-textually or in principle. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-
ORL-4oGJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *o (M.D. Fla. Aug. io, 2016); United States v. Werdene,
No. 15-434, 2016 WL 3002376, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2016). But see United States v. Laurita,
No. 8:13CR1o 7 , 2016 WL 4179365, at *7 (D. Neb. Aug. 5, 2016); United States v. Eure, No.
2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016). There was a plausible argument
that District Court judges retained authority to issue these types of warrants under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103, regardless of Rule 41.
204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(b)(6). See Daskal, supra note 29, at 355-59 (reviewing the proposed
amendments); Lerner, supra note 28 (similar); see also Ghappour, supra note 28, at lo8o-81
(criticizing the proposed amendments). The discussion above centers on FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(b)(6)(A), because it resolved an outstanding and difficult venue issue in malware-based
investigations. The new amendment also added FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (6) (B), which stream-
lines the warrant process for remotely accessing compromised devices in multi-district inves-
tigations.
205. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's notes.
206. The extra-territoriality provision for terrorism investigations still applies to law enforcement
hacking. If the government is investigating "domestic terrorism or international terrorism," it
can apply for a hacking warrant in "any district in which activities related to the terrorism may
have occurred." FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(b) (3).




Judicial rules are not the only venue constraints on warrant issuance.2 08
United States Magistrate Judges are Article I judges, invested with only the pow-
ers that Congress has provided. And the Federal Magistrates Act includes an ex-
press geographic restriction. A magistrate possesses "all powers and duties con-
ferred or imposed ... by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts."209 But a magistrate only has those powers or du-
ties "within the district in which sessions are held by the court that appointed
the magistrate judge, at other places where that court may function, and else-
where as authorized by law."210 In other words, in a plain reading of the statutory
text, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can only create new powers and
duties for magistrate judges within their district. The Federal Rules cannot create
extra-district powers or duties.
Warrants that authorize law enforcement hacking often involve searches of
extra-district property. The question under the Federal Magistrates Act is: are
those searches an exercise of extra-district power, such that they must be author-
ized by statute rather than rule?
Recent congressional experience suggests that the answer is yes. In every in-
stance where magistrate judges have received new authority to issue warrants for
extra-district persons or property, the change has only occurred after legislative
authorization.2 11 The Rule 41 provision allowing extra-district warrants in ter-
rorism investigations was a component of the USA PATRIOT Act, which ex-
pressly empowered magistrates.212 The provision allowing extra-district track-
ing device operation followed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
which also expressly empowered courts.2 13 The provision allowing extra-district
2o8. See United States v. Irueger, 809 F.3 d 11o9, 1117-26 (loth Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(detailing how the Federal Magistrates Act imposes warrant venue provisions); see also United
States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *7-8 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 25, 2016) (concluding that a magistrate's issuance of a warrant to hack Tor users violated
the Federal Magistrates Act).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (1) (2012).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
211. Relatedly, in the instance where magistrate judges received new authority to preside outside
their district, that was also authorized by legislation. The statutory authority for magistrates
to operate "at other places where that court may function" was added in 2005, as a response
to the displacement of federal courts following Hurricane K atrina. See Krueger, 809 F.3 d at
1121 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
212. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct TerrorismAct of 2ool (USA PATRIOTAct), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 219,115 Stat.
272,291. While the provision addressing extra-district search warrants is framed as an amend-
ment to Rule 41, it is nevertheless a congressional enactment.
213. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 1o8(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
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search warrants for federal lands has a basis in the statute providing a default
venue for crimes committed on federal lands.2 14 Extra-district warrants for
stored communications content are solely established by statute, rather than a
provision of the rule.215
While the issue is a close one, in the author's view, the better position is that
magistrate judges currently lack statutory authority to issue extra-district hack-
ing warrants. Thankfully, there is a straightforward workaround for the issue.
District court judges are also empowered to issue search warrants, and they are
not subject to the constraints of the Federal Magistrates Act.216 When the gov-
ernment intends to search a computer but does not know the computer's loca-
tion, it can (and must) submit a warrant application to a district court judge
rather than a magistrate judge.
D. Search Duration
When law enforcement agents exploit a device, they conduct a Fourth
Amendment search and they presumptively must obtain a warrant. But how
long does the search last and, consequently, what time period must the warrant
cover?
The view of the Department of Justice appears to be that, to the extent hack-
ing constitutes a search, the search occurs solely at the moment of exploitation.
In the Timberline case, for instance, investigators combined a search warrant
with a lesser pen/trap order. The search warrant was valid for only lo days, and
covered installation of the malware; the pen/trap order was valid for 6o days,
and covered subsequent execution by and reporting from the malware.2 17
The government's approach is not consistent with Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples. As discussed in Part I, law enforcement hacking is a Fourth Amendment
search because the government breaches the logical integrity of an electronic de-
vice. That breach of integrity first occurs at the exploitation stage, when law en-
forcement agents circumvent technical protections on the device. But that breach
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2012).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
216. District court judges are authorized to issue search warrants under 18 U.S.C. § 3102 (2012),
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provide district court judges with all
of the powers of magistrate judges. FED. R. ClIM. P. 1(c). Courts have also understood that
Rule 41 regulates warrants issued by district court judges, even though the text of the rule
references magistrates. See, e.g., United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 51-53 (3d Cir. 2014);
United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013).




of integrity continues throughout the execution stage, so long as the government
malware is resident and running on the suspect's device.
Drawing a parallel to physical searches is instructive. When the government
compromises physical integrity to conduct a search, such as by installing a loca-
tion tracker on a car218 or an electronic device in a home,2 1 9 courts have unhesi-
tatingly concluded that an ongoing warrant is required. A rule allowing for con-
tinued malware operation without a warrant would represent an unsupported
distinction between physical and electronic integrity.
Case law related to wiretapping also favors an ongoing warrant. The Su-
preme Court has emphasized that interception of communications requires a
continuously valid super-warrant,22 0 and the Wiretap Act imposes ongoing sub-
stantive requirements.2 21 A rule permitting continued computer hacking with a
one-time judicial determination would create unjustified inconsistency between
the treatment of malware and of other means of collecting information.
The doctrinal result is that there is a Fourth Amendment search throughout
the duration of malware operation. The government must obtain a warrant that
is continuously valid from exploitation through execution. A pen/trap order
does not suffice, because it does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause and particularity requirements.2 22
The temporal regulation of law enforcement hacking under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure is straightforward. Under the current Rule 41, a warrant
218. See, e.g., United States v. Katzin, 732 F-3d 187, 198 (3d Cir. 2013) ("We thus have no hesitation
in holding that the police must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS device on a vehicle,
thereby undertaking a search that the Supreme Court has compared to 'a constable's conceal-
ing himself in the target's coach in order to track its movements."' (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400,4o6 n.3 (2012))).
219. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) ("This Court has never held
that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a
man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent crim-
inal trial what was seen or heard.").
220. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (" [A]uthorization of eavesdropping for a two-
month period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a
single showing of probable cause.").
221. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) ("No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the in-
terception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is neces-
sary to achieve the objective of the authorization . . . .").
222. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012) (requiring only a self-certification of relevance to substantiate
a pen/trap order), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
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must be executed within fourteen days of issuance.223 The government, then,
has fourteen days to hack a device and collect data from it. After fourteen days,
the government must either obtain a new warrant or disable its malware.22 4
In at least five additional cases, the government has failed to adhere to this
simple formulation. A 2012 warrant in the District of Colorado authorized mal-
ware operation for fourteen days after installation (whenever that occurred), ra-
ther than fourteen days after warrant issuance.225 The accompanying affidavit
suggested treating installation as a warrant triggering condition, allowing for
extended time.226 But that reasoning misunderstands the doctrine of anticipa-
tory warrants, which allows for conditional search execution; the warrant is still
issued, and the Rule 41 clock starts running, once it is signed by the reviewing
judge. 22 7
In a trio of District of Nebraska warrants that same year, authorizing the Op-
eration Torpedo investigation, the FBI obtained approval for computer searches
with two distinct time periods. Agents had fourteen days to install malware de-
livery software onto a webserver that they had seized, in accordance with the
Federal Rules. 2 28 But they had thirty days to install and operate malware on com-
puters that visited the website. 2 29 The warrant application did not justify this
extended time limit, nor did it indicate the source.
Three 2013 warrants in the District of Maryland, associated with the Free-
dom Hosting investigation, used the same formulation: fourteen days to begin
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (2) (A) (i).
224. Courts have, in the past, authorized deviations from Rule 41's time limit for subsequent fo-
rensic examination of seized computer data. See United States v. Kernell, No. 3:08-CR-142,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32845, at *38-43 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining the issue and
collecting cases). That fact pattern is very different from government hacking, of course: po-
lice have long been authorized to inspect evidence after seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Til-
lotson, No. 2:08-CR-33, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120701, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2008)
("The subsequent analysis of the computer's contents is not a search in the sense contem-
plated by Rule 41 . . . ."). And, at any rate, Rule 41 was explicitly amended to address the tim-
ing of post-seizure forensic examinations. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (2) (B) (clarifying that the
Rule 41 time limits apply to "the seizure or on-site copying of the media or information, and
not to any later off-site copying or review").
225. Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 37, at 30.
226. Id. at 26.
227. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (2) (A) ("The warrant must command the officer to execute the war-
rant within a specified time no longer than 14 days . . . ."); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S.
90, 95-96 (20o6) (explaining that an anticipatory warrant involves a present determination
by a judge).
228. E.g., Application for "Bulletin Board A" Search Warrant, supra note 41, at 38.




the watering hole attack and thirty days to complete the attack.23 0 The filings
were virtually identical to the Operation Torpedo applications.
A 2013 warrant application in the Southern District of Texas requested a
thirty-day period for installation and operation.23 1 Once again, there was no as-
serted basis for the extended time limit. (In fact, the earlier Colorado affidavit
expressly amended out a thirty-day time limit, explaining that it was "mis-
taken."232 )
Most recently, a 2015 warrant in the Eastern District of Virginia-the basis
for Operation Pacifier - again parroted the earlier Operation Torpedo warrants.
The FBI received approval to install their malware delivery on the seized website
within fourteen days and to install and operate the malware on suspect comput-
ers within thirty days.233 Again, there was no justification for the warrant's tim-
ing provisions.
Federal agents would, understandably, prefer not to be burdened with a mal-
ware warrant renewal every two weeks. Declassified FBI emails reflect extensive
discussion about how to circumvent the explicit time limit imposed by the Fed-
230. Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 42; Affidavit in Support
of Application for Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access Target E-Mail Ac-
counts, supra note 47; Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, In re Search of
Computs. that Access the E-Mail Accounts Described in Attachment A, supra note 47.
231. In re Warrant To Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756
(S.D. Tex. 2013) (malware warrant application seeking "prospective data obtained during a
30-day monitoring period").
232. Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 37, at 7.
233. Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, supra note 43, at 30, 32-34.
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eral Rules, including invocation of the (likely inapplicable) tracking device pro-
visions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act234 and the (definitely in-
applicable) All Writs Act.2 3 5
Rather than evade Rule 41 and its constitutional basis by invoking irrelevant
statutes or slipping extra time into warrant applications, the government should
propose a simple amendment. There is already a template: in order to facilitate
location-tracking devices, the Federal Rules were amended in 20o6 with provi-
sions that set out discrete time periods for installation and operation.2 36 A similar
set of time limits should be expressly set out for government malware.
234. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: [Redacted] (Nov. 20, 20o6), in 8 ELEc. FRON-
TIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE, supra note 167, at 154, 154 (discussing how to maximize
the duration of malware operation under one court order). The tracking device statute, is
U.S.C. § 3117 (2012), empowers courts to issue warrants for "tracking devices"; its implemen-
tation in Rule 41(e) (2) (C) specifies a maximum of ten days for installation and forty-five days
for operation. The DOJ has consistently argued that these tracking device provisions do not
cover purely electronic location-tracking techniques, in a bid to avoid a warrant requirement
for mobile phone location tracking. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 681 (W.D. La. 20o6). It would be incongruous for the DOJ to reverse that
critical argument after a decade - and solely to extend a renewal clock in hacking cases. More-
over, identification malware does not itself locate a device in any conventional sense. Rather,
it gives the government sufficient network and device configuration information to determine
the owner's identity through follow-up investigation. And even if some of the functionality of
government malware could be characterized as a tracking device, much of the functionality
could not. Only a subset of the malware's operation would be covered by the longer time limit.
235. See Email from [Redacted] to [Redacted] Re: CIPAV Court Orders (Nov. 21, 20o6), in 8
ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND., CIPAV FOIA RELEASE, supra note 167, at 149 ("One comment that
has come in from my unit re the draft orders that should be forwarded to AUSA [redacted] is
that he should also cite to the All Writs Act . . . ."). Courts invoke the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, to compel third-party assistance with warrant execution. That includes assistance with
ongoing electronic surveillance. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171-78 (1977)
(sustaining the use of a warrant, in conjunction with the All Writs Act, to compel a telephone
company to prospectively provide call records). But the All Writs Act is only relevant to third-
party assistance associated with an electronic search, not any ongoing nature of the search.
And even if there were any prospective search authority under the All Writs Act, it would be
displaced by the more specific time limits imposed by Rule 41. See Pa. Bureau of Correction v.
U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 40-43 (1985) (emphasizing that the All Writs Act is a "resid-
ual source of authority" that is overridden by more specific provisions).
236. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (2) (C) (setting out time limits for installation and operation of a loca-
tion-tracking device pursuant to a warrant). Before federal and state rules were amended to
address tracking devices, the ordinary law enforcement practice was to obtain a series of time-
limited warrants (if they obtained warrants at all). See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220-






Since the Founding Era, courts have imposed notice requirements on law
enforcement searches.237 Ex ante notice, often dubbed "knock-and-announce,"
minimizes the disruption and damage associated with conducting a search.238
The Supreme Court's most recent pre-execution notice guidance, in Wilson v.
Arkansas, explained that ex ante notice is "an element of the reasonableness in-
quiry under the Fourth Amendment."239
Ex post notice serves different policy aims: it facilitates transparency and
promotes confidence in government investigative practices that do not involve
ex ante notice, ensuring that law enforcement officers comply with legal con-
straints.24 0 While some courts have required after-the-fact notice based on the
Fourth Amendment itself,241 others only consider it a requirement of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.24 2
Doctrine on ex ante notice clearly permits electronic surveillance without
pre-execution announcement. A rule to the contrary would frustrate the very
purpose of the investigation, tipping off suspects and preventing collection of
evidence.24 3 Wiretap super-warrants and location-tracking warrants are regu-
larly issued with delayed notice, and Congress has provided general authority
237. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amend-
ment "Rule Requiring Notice," 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 561-70 (2014) (reviewing an unbroken
history of search notice requirements); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrin-
ciples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 802-03 (1994) (describing ex post notice as a central feature of
Fourth Amendment warrants).
238. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (1995) (explaining historical policy rationales for
ex ante search notice).
239. Id. at 934.
240. See generally Brian L. Owsley, To Unseal or Not To Unseal: The Judiciary's Role in Preventing
Transparency in Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders, 5 CALIF. L. REv. CIR. 259 (2014)
(discussing policy concerns associated with sealed surveillance orders).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Freitas, Soo F.2d 1451, 1456 ( 9 th Cit. 1986) (holding that, if a court
issues a warrant for surreptitious entry of a home, the Fourth Amendment mandates ex post
notice with minimum delay); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 6o (1967) (describing
notice as a "requirement" for "conventional warrants").
242. See, e.g., United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Although we have
required that seven days notice be given after covert entries for which search without physical
seizure has been authorized, that notice requirement is grounded in [Rule 41] and is not com-
pelled by the Constitution.").
243. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting the futility of ex ante notice for wire-
tap surveillance, because it would undermine the government's ability to use such surveillance
at all).
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for delayed-notice ("sneak and peek") warrants.24 4 The same procedure should
be constitutionally permissible for government malware.
Ex post notice poses more difficult questions for law enforcement hacking.
Is it required? Who receives the notice? How must it be provided? This Section
establishes the principles for each of these subsidiary issues, then compares the
resulting standards with current government practice.
Whether mandated by the Fourth Amendment or not, Rule 41 and its asso-
ciated statutes are textually unambiguous. The government must eventually pro-
vide notice of a search warrant's execution.245 Courts have broad, case-specific
discretion to delay notice, but there must ultimately be notice. Hacking warrants,
then, are subject to an ex post notice requirement too.
Conventional searches, wiretap super-warrants, and location-tracking war-
rants are all typically accompanied by eventual notice to the person with the pri-
vacy interest in the search. Courts have relaxed that requirement, under both the
Fourth Amendment and Rule 41, where property or data are in the possession of
a third-party business. For example, searches of parcels in transit have been held
permissible with notice solely to the shipping company.2 46 Searches of electronic
content stored with a cloud service provider have similarly been allowed with
notice only to the third-party business.24 7 When executing a hacking warrant,
244. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2012) (requiring actual service of notice within ninety days of a wire-
tap's conclusion); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2012) (granting general authority for delayed-notice
search and seizure warrants); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f)( 3 ) (permitting issuance of delayed-notice
warrants where authorized by statute).
245. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S.
House of Representatives 7 (July 25, 2003), https://cdt.org/files/security/usapatriot
/030 725doj.pdf [http://perma.cc/XUE8-QS8K] (explaining that the delayed-notice search
statute "requires law enforcement to give notice that a search warrant has been executed in all
circumstances"); cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena for [Redacted] @yahoo.com, No. 5:15-cr-
9oo96-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17379, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (rejecting an indef-
inite gag order for electronic-data warrants and subpoenas).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 465 F.3 d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 20o6) (permitting notice of a
package seizure by leaving a copy of the warrant with FedEx).
247. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) does not statutorily require notice to a subscriber
after the government executes a search warrant for content stored with a service provider. 18
U.S.C. § 27 03 (b) (1) (A) (2012). Courts disagree on whether the SCA expressly eliminates any
notice requirement, or merely defers to the notice provisions of Rule 41. Compare United
States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 84-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (concluding that the SCA mandates
notice only where investigators have not obtained a warrant), with In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216-21 (D. Or. 2009) (holding that the SCA incor-
porates Rule 41, including its notice provisions). Furthermore, at the time the SCA was en-
acted, Congress (and the courts) believed that content stored with a third-party business was
often exempt from Fourth Amendment protection. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d




though, these third-party notice cases are not applicable, because the govern-
ment is conducting a search of the suspect's own computer system by directly
breaking into it. The notice associated with a hacking warrant, then, must be
directed to the suspect herself.
The usual format for furnishing ex post notice of a search is actual notice -
a copy of the warrant and a receipt for anything seized.248 Wiretap super-war-
rants and location-tracking warrants follow the same approach.24 9 The Fourth
Amendment and Rule 41 do permit for constructive notice, though: investigators
may leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the location of the search, rather
than handing it directly to the affected person.250 Recent amendments to Rule 41
imposing a warrant requirement for content privately stored with third-party services). Based
on a modem understanding, then, a warrant for content stored with a service provider must
satisfy the notice requirements of the Fourth Amendment (to the extent they exist) and Rule
41 (to the extent they are not uniquely abrogated by the SCA). These notice requirements are
both satisfied because the warrant is executed via a third party. See In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22 (holding that a warrant for stored content, exe-
cuted via a third-party service provider, satisfies Rule 41's notice requirements); id. at 1222-24
(same for Fourth Amendment's notice requirement). Microsoft brought a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to the DOJ policy against notifying suspects whose stored content is searched.
See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice at 13-14, No.
2:16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 2016). Microsoft agreed to dismiss the case when
the DOJ adopted a new policy on gag orders for service providers; the policy does not require
notice to defendants. See Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att'y Gen., to the
Heads of the Dep't Law Enf't Components, the Heads of the Dep't Litigating Components,
the Dir. of the Exec. Office for U.S. Att'ys, and All U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 19, 2017), https://as-
sets.documentcloud.org/documents/4116o81/Policy-Regarding-Applications-for
-Protective.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XSC-5C4K].
248. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f) (1) (C) ("The officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the war-
rant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises,
the property was taken. . . .").
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2012) (" [T]he issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on
the persons named in the order or the application, and such other parties to intercepted com-
munications as the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an
inventory [of the wiretap application and execution]."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f)(2) (C) ("[T]he
officer executing a tracking-device warrant must serve a copy of the warrant on the person
who was tracked or whose property was tracked. Service may be accomplished by delivering
a copy to the person who, or whose property, was tracked . . . .").
250. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f)(1)(C) (allowing constructive notice by "leav[ing] a copy of the warrant
and receipt at the place where the officer took the property"); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(f)(2) (C) (allowing constructive notice of a tracking device warrant "by leaving a copy at
the person's residence or usual place of abode with an individual of suitable age and discretion
who resides at that location and by mailing a copy to the person's last known address").
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clarify that the same minimum applies to a hacking warrant: government mal-
ware must be accompanied by constructive notice.251
In sum, Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment impose three requirements for
ex post notice of law enforcement hacking. First, the government must provide
eventual notice. Second, the government must provide that notice to the device's
owner. Third, the notice can be actual or constructive.
When the government executes a hacking warrant for a known computer, it
appears to usually comply with these three requirements.25 2 It provides eventual
notice, to the computer's owner, through actual (not just constructive) service.
When the government deploys identification malware, by contrast, it pres-
ently falls far short of the three requirements. The current practice is to provide
no notice of hacking to any affected person in any form until subsequent investi-
gation discloses the identity of a hacked computer's likely owner. In more precise
legal terms, the government believes it can particularly describe a computer to
hack, but cannot reasonably describe a place to leave notice or a person to notify.
Recent hacking warrant applications almost uniformly rely upon this type of
conditional ex post notice.253 The operational consequence is that the govern-
ment can hack with no transparency until it elects to subpoena a particular
251. FED. R. CluM. P. 4 1(f)(1)(C) ("For a warrant to use remote access ... the officer must make
reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and receipt on the person whose property
was searched .... Service may be accomplished by any means, including electronic means,
reasonably calculated to reach that person."). The amendment is a clarification of the existing
notice requirement, rather than a new notice requirement. The rule text prior to the amend-
ment still imposed a constructive notice requirement, and the delayed-notice statute still ap-
plied. See Memorandum from David Bitkower, supra note 92, at 8 (acknowledging that, even
without the hacking-specific notice amendment to Rule 41, the DOJ is still bound by the de-
layed-notice statute when it deploys malware); id. at 9 (suggesting that the hacking-specific
notice provision is grounded in the Fourth Amendment).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, i8o F. Supp. 2d 572, 574-75 (D.N.J. 2001) (providing a time-
line for an FBI investigation). The author has confirmed this understanding with attorneys
in the DOJ's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section.
253. See, e.g., Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 37, at 24 (specifying
that "the government may delay providing a copy of the search warrant and the receipt for
any property taken until the time that a suspect has been identified and has been placed in
custody"); id. at 13 (requesting delayed notice "because the investigation has not identified an
appropriate person to whom such notice can be given"); Application for "Bulletin Board A"
Search Warrant, supra note 41, at 35-36 (specifying that "the government may delay providing
a copy of the search warrant and the receipt for any property taken for thirty (30) days after a
user of an 'activating' computer that accessed 'Bulletin Board A' has been identified to a suffi-
cient degree as to provide notice"); Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note
4, at 16 (specifying that "the FBI may delay providing a copy of the search warrant and the
receipt for any property taken until no more than thirty (3o) days after such time as the name




hacked user's ISP for subscriber information and identifies the user through fur-
ther investigation.2 54 That result poses an extraordinary privacy risk: the gov-
ernment can hack a large number of computers and then, in its exclusive discre-
tion, furnish ex post notice to their owners.
This is, unfortunately, not a hypothetical. In the 2013 Freedom Hosting in-
vestigation, discussed above, the FBI deployed identification malware on seized
webservers.25 5 The FBI's watering hole strategy extended far beyond child por-
nography websites, reaching a number of non-criminal services -including a
popular email provider.2 56 Because of its approach to hacking warrant notice,
though, the FBI appears to have been able to escape legal repercussions. Thou-
sands of innocent American users (if not more) may have had their Fourth
Amendment rights violated, and they may even have had meritorious claims for
damages.25 7 But they never learned that their computers were breached, because
the FBI never subpoenaed for their identities.
The ideal resolution for hacking warrant notice would be another amend-
ment to Rule 41. While the recent amendments did clarify that the government
must make "reasonable efforts" to provide notice that is "reasonably calculated"
to reach the person whose device was hacked,258 the overall constructive notice
requirement remains quite vague. Rule 41 already includes special notice proce-
dures for tracking devices;259 a similar set of provisions for government malware
would lend much-needed clarity.
There are several possible strategies for constructive notice. The government
might, for instance, change a hacked device's wallpaper or provide a pop-up
alert. Another option would be to ensure actual notice by requiring the govern-
254. See United States v. Welch, 811 F.3 d 275, 279-80 (8th Cir. 2016).
255. See Poulsen, supra note 42.
256. See Joseph Cox, FBIMay Have Hacked Innocent TorMail Users, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 21,
2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/en us/article/wnx5px/fbi-may-have-hacked-innocent
-tormail-users [http://perma.cc/UBV9-LAZ3]; Joseph Cox, Unsealed Court Docs Show FBI
Used Malware Like A Grenade', VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 7, 2016), http://motherboard
.vice.com/en-us/article/wnxbqw/unsealed-court-docs-show-fbi-used-malware-like-a
-grenade [http://perma.cc/SV3B-NSLM]; Poulsen, supra note 53; Kevin Poulsen, If You Used
This Secure Webmail Site, the FBI Has Your Inbox, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.wired.com/2o14/o1/tormail/ [http://perma.cc/UY4T-EBFE].
257. See Joe Uchill, ACLU Questions How Tor Email Users Got FBI-Deployed Malware, HILL (Sept.
6, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/294618-aclu-why-did-email-service-users
-get-fbi-deployed-malware [http://perma.cc/3D9M-N6LJ].
258. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f ) (1) (C).
259. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 1(f)(2)(C) (describing special ex post notice provisions for tracking
device warrants).
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ment to subpoena a hacked device's ISP. Investigators could then guarantee ac-
tual notice through ordinary, in-person service. A compromise approach, which
would minimize the marginal privacy impact for the device's owner while ensur-
ing notice, would be to require the government to send a notification to a hacked
device's ISP and compel the ISP to forward the notice to the relevant sub-
scriber.260 While all three approaches have drawbacks, it is difficult to maintain
that none would satisfy the Rule 41 reasonableness standard.2 61
Regardless of whether Rule 41 is amended further, judges should cease issu-
ing conditional-notice hacking warrants. As the Eighth Circuit recently recog-
nized in a narrow ruling, the mandatory notice period for a malware search runs
from the moment of search execution, not the moment that law enforcement
agents learn a suspect's residential address or name.26 2 The FBI's current practice
is inconsistent with Rule 41 and (possibly) with the Fourth Amendment.
Judges should also insist that investigators write notice procedures into
hacking warrant applications. Reasonable minds can disagree about the relative
merits of the various approaches to constructive notice, but investigators should
make a clear commitment to some approach in advance of installing malware.
F. Super-Warrant Requirements
In Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fourth Amend-
ment mandates more stringent procedures (dubbed "super-warrants" by some
scholars) for interception of real-time communications.263 As implemented in
the Wiretap Act, the four core safeguards are: a determination that ordinary in-
vestigative techniques have failed or would likely be ineffective,264 a particular
26o. The FBI used a very similar notification process during a 2011 operation to disable the Co-
reflood botnet. See Gov't's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for a Temp. Restrain-
ing Order at *8, No. 3:ni-cv-oo561-VLB (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 2011).
261. The government might not want to leave malware resident on a suspect's computer longer
than is necessary; subpoenaing a person's identity is an extra (albeit slight) privacy intrusion;
and involving ISPs in sending notifications could introduce extra process burdens.
262. United States v. Welch, 811 F.3 d 275, 279-81 (8th Cir. 2016).
263. 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967).




description of the communications sought,265 a firm time limit on the surveil-
lance,266 and a strategy for minimizing the interception of non-pertinent com-
munications. 67 The Act permits wiretaps only for investigations into enumer-
ated serious offenses,26 8 and it requires prompt notice to the target.26 9 The
Wiretap Act also provides for annual reports on federal and state investigative
practices.2 7 0
The Berger doctrine and the Wiretap Act plainly apply to phone wiretaps and
audio bugs. If government malware activates a computer's microphone or oth-
erwise intercepts a private spoken conversation, then it unambiguously must be
operated with a super-warrant.2 7 1
In the decades following Berger, a number of cases posed the question of how
the Fourth Amendment regulates video surveillance.2 72 The unanimous conclu-
sion among federal appellate courts has been that the Wiretap Act does not ap-
ply, but the Berger doctrine does. Courts must, consequently, borrow the core
super-warrant protections from the Wiretap Act when authorizing video surveil-
lance. The result for law enforcement malware is clear guidance: if agents seek
to enable a computer's camera, they must obtain a super-warrant in advance.2 73
265. Id. § 2518(1)(b)(iii).
266. Id. § 2518(1)(d).
267. Id. § 2518(5).
268. Id. § 2518 (3) (a).
269. Id. § 2518(8)(d).
270. Id. § 2519.
271. See Memorandum from David Bitkower to Judge Reena Raggi, supra note 92, at 9 (noting
that the real-time communications content interception provisions of the Wiretap Act remain
applicable to government hacking).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-85 (7 th Cir. 1984) (holding that the four
core protections of the Wiretap Act are mandated by the Fourth Amendment for video sur-
veillance and that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are sufficiently flexible to accom-
modate those super-warrant safeguards); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 507-12 (2d
Cit. 1986) (following Torres); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir.
1987) (adopting Biasucci and Torres); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436 -46
(loth Cir. 1990) (applying the four core protections of the Wiretap Act to video surveillance);
United States v. Koyomejian, 97o F.2d 536, 538-42 ( 9 th Cit. 1992) (following Cuevas-
Sanchez); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679-83 (8th Cir. 1994) (following and applying
Koyomejian); United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 416-20 (3d Cit. 1997) (assuming the
correctness of Torres).
273. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
759-61 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that the core Berger requirements apply to FBI malware that
activates a computer's webcam).
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In at least one malware-based investigation, though, the FBI failed to adhere to
this requirement.274
Internet connectivity is a third easy-to-spot area of super-warrant coverage.
Courts have consistently applied Berger and the Wiretap Act to real-time inter-
ception of online content.2 75 If government malware intercepts content flowing
through a computer's Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Ethernet, or any other network inter-
face, it must be installed and operated with a super-warrant.
A fourth fact pattern with unambiguous Berger and Wiretap Act coverage is
where the government remotely monitors keystrokes or screen content in real-
time or near-real-time.2 76 When computer systems were only temporarily con-
nected to the internet via a modem, the government was (arguably) able to evade
heightened wiretapping requirements by recording only while the suspect was
connected.2 7 7 Given the modern reality of always-on internet connectivity,
though, contemporaneous keystroke logging and screen capturing malware will
generally require a super-warrant.
Outside of these four areas, the applicability of super-warrant doctrine to
government hacking remains entirely unsettled. How should the courts and
Congress more generally reconcile Berger and the Wiretap Act with government
malware? The following Section proposes that government hacking should not
just presumptively require a warrant -it should presumptively require a super-
warrant.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3 d 920, 926-36 (9 th Cir. 2013) (applying the Wiretap Act
to wireless network interception); United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3 d 67, 69-85 (ist Cir.
2005) (holding that email interception is covered under the Wiretap Act). If the government
obtains solely real-time communications metadata in conjunction with a hack, it must com-
port with the pen register statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2012). Since a warrant is substan-
tively more rigorous then a pen/trap order, the only practical implication is that a federal in-
vestigation must be included in an annual Department of Justice pen/trap report. is U.S.C.
§ 3126 (2012).
276. See Luis v. Zang, No. 1:11-cv-884, 2013 WL 811816, at *4-9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013) (review-
ing litigation on keyloggers and concluding that, if malware reports keystrokes to a remote
party, it implicates the WiretapAct); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130542, at *37-44 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2012) (holding that screen capture software that recorded
email activity was covered by the Wiretap Act). Courts have generally not required that the
transmission of recorded activity be precisely contemporaneous with the activity. See Williams
v. Stoddard, No. PC 12-3664, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 58, at *19-30 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 11,
2015) (summarizing perspectives on wiretap timing).
277. See United States v. Scarfo, i8o F. Supp. 2d 572, 581-82 (D.N.J. 2001) (declining to apply the





G. Policy Arguments in Favor of Always Requiring a Super-Warrant
In their concurring opinion in Berger, Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart
highlighted their policy motivation for developing super-warrant doctrine. Elec-
tronic surveillance raises the specter of the "invisible policeman," they wrote.2 78
" [I]t is the greatest of all invasions of privacy. It places a government agent in
the bedroom, in the business conference, in the social hour, in the lawyer's of-
fice - everywhere and anywhere a 'bug' can be placed."2 79
These Justices surely could not have imagined modern information technol-
ogy. Americans already carry around "minicomputers" in their pockets and on
their wrists, replete with audio, video, and location sensors.280 Government
agents need not "place" any monitoring gear of their own; rather, they can sub-
vert already-ubiquitous sensors and storage devices. If the potential for omni-
present state surveillance is the criterion for super-warrant doctrine, it is difficult
to imagine a more qualifying investigative technique than government hacking.
Another rationale for imposing super-warrant requirements on law enforce-
ment malware is the risk of dragnet data collection. Courts have emphasized that
surreptitious audio and video surveillance tend to record innocent individuals
and noncriminal conduct.28 1 Law enforcement hacking poses dragnet risks, too,
albeit in a somewhat different manner. Unlike with audio and video surveillance,
the government can explicitly constrain the types of information that it receives.
But, much like with audio and video recording, the government's investigative
technique might affect the privacy interests of innocent (virtual) bystanders.
278. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 64-65.
28o. See Riley v. California, 134S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) ("The term 'cell phone' is itself misleading
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the ca-
pacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspa-
pers.").
281. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 59 ("[T]he conversations of any and all persons coming into the area
covered by the device will be seized indiscriminately and without regard to their connection
with the crime under investigation."); id. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The traditional
wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device constitutes a dragnet, sweeping in all conversa-
tions within its scope -without regard to the participants or the nature of the conversations.
It intrudes upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most
intimate of conversations."); see also United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986)
(" [C] oncern with the indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance led the Berger Court to
require that a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance be sufficiently precise so as to mini-
mize the recording of activities not related to the crimes under investigation."); United States
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 ( 7 th Cir. 1984) ("Television surveillance is identical in its indiscrim-
inate character to wiretapping and bugging.").
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And, because software scales so easily, the magnitude of collateral surveillance
can be - and already may be - extraordinary. Under a super-warrant regime, in-
vestigators would have to be much more explicit about the scope of the devices
they intend to hack and the information they seek to obtain.
A super-warrant mandate would also serve a beneficial channeling function.
In many modern investigations, the government can obtain data through multi-
ple means, such as by serving a warrant on a cloud service, physically seizing a
suspect's computer, breaking into the suspect's cloud account, or hacking the
suspect's computer. Warrants served on technology companies are preferable:
they allow for regular transparency reporting, and they impose an added inde-
pendent and impartial intermediary between the government and a wealth of
user data.2 82 Computer seizures are the next best option: they result in forensic
analysis of a disk image, accompanied by a detailed log of investigative queries.
Hacking techniques could circumvent these valuable transparency and review
procedures, replacing them with ad hoc investigative practice. If the super-war-
rant doctrine applied, the government would have to explain why a cloud service
or a seizure of a physical device would not work before a court sanctioned a hack.
Predictability is another virtue of a uniform super-warrant approach. The
alternative would be carefully parsing the information that law enforcement ob-
tains via hacking warrants, nitpicking which categories of data fall on which side
of the super-warrant line. However difficult that approach may be today, it will
only be more complex in the future. As more and more device functionality in-
corporates an online component-from applications to operating systems-
courts would be left to arbitrarily delineate between warrant and super-warrant
hacking.2 83
282. See Cardozo et al., supra note 74, at 13 (collecting business policies for handling government
data demands, including annual transparency reports); Google, Way of a Warrant, YouTUBE
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch'v=MeKKHxcJfho [http://perma.cc/YS53
-QUYA] (explaining that Google requires search warrants for user content, examines war-
rants for errors, narrows production for overbroad warrants, and notifies users of government
demands); see also, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant Facebook, Inc. at 3-9, In re 381 Search
Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. and Dated July 23, 2013, No. 30207-13 (N.Y. App. Div.
June 20, 2014) (describing Facebook's challenge to search warrants from the New York
County District Attorney for user content with questionable probable cause support and no
date or content restrictions).
283. Imagine that the government hacks a user's device and monitors their files. So far, courts have
concluded that super-warrant doctrine does not apply. But, in the future, a user's files will be
automatically synced to remote services and other devices (e.g. Apple's iCloud). Those synced
files are plainly electronic communications under the Wiretap Act and the Berger doctrine.




Externalities provide yet another reason for adopting super-warrants. In the
wake of recent foreign intelligence disclosures, trust in information technology
has become a critical commercial concern. Recent estimates place costs to Amer-
ican businesses in the tens of billions of dollars.284 Trust in technology is also a
critical civil liberties concern: researchers have documented speech chilling ef-
fects associated with government surveillance.2 85 With each episode of hacking,
the government imposes real costs that it does not internalize. A super-warrant
requirement forces a degree of internalization, requiring extra detail and justifi-
cation in the surveillance application.
Regardless of how courts respond to this normative argument, Congress
could easily impose wiretap protections on law enforcement malware.286 Legis-
lation could simply combine the existing definition of hacking from the CFAA-
messy as it is -with the existing super-warrant procedure from the Wiretap
Act.2 8 7
284. See ED FERRERAET AL., FORRESTERRESEARCH INC., GOVERNMENT SPYING WILL COST US VEN-
DORS FEWER BILLIONS THAN INITIAL ESTIMATES 2 (2015) (estimating $47 billion in costs over
three years); Daniel Castro & Alan McQuinn, Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveil-
lance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (June 2015),
http://WWW2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedom-act.pdf [http://perma.cc/WX2U-SXCN]
(estimating well over $35 billion in costs over three years).
285. See, e.g., JonathonW. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 117-72 (2016) (concluding that surveillance disclosures chilled online activity);
Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior
40 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=2412564 [http://
perma.cc/BW5B-TY78] (finding that Google users' search behavior changed as a result of the
surveillance revelations in June 2013); see also Margot E. K aminski & Shane Witnov, The Con-
forming Effect: FirstAmendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 RICH. L.
REV. 465, 466-67 (2015) (linking government surveillance to First Amendment interests). But
see S6ren Preibusch, Privacy Behaviors After Snowden, 59 COMm. ACM 48, 48 (2015) (conclud-
ing that surveillance disclosures led to a decrease - not an increase - in privacy behaviors).
286. Whether privacy protections should be initially imposed by Congress or the courts is a subject
of scholarly debate. Compare Orin S. K err, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Con-
stitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (arguing that
Congress should be the primary source of privacy rules), with David Alan Sklansky, Two More
Ways Not To Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 224-33
(2015) (arguing that the courts should not wait for Congress to create privacy rules).
287. For example, Congress could amend the CFAA to read:
(f) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective,
or intelligence activity of an intelligence agency of the United States.
(g) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative or protec-
tive activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision of a State, provided that the agency has complied with the procedure
established in 18 U.S.C. 5S 2518.
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III. LESSONS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT THEORY
Recent theoretical scholarship on the Fourth Amendment and electronic sur-
veillance tends to be -at the risk of overgeneralization - either backward-look-
ing or forward-looking. Some influential articles have carefully examined past
judicial pronouncements in the interest of harmonizing seemingly inconsistent
case law (and have often recommended that courts stay the course).288 Other
significant contributions have taken a normative tack, articulating how the prin-
ciples of constitutional privacy protection could and should develop in the fu-
ture.289 Some of the best work has been process-oriented, examining the inter-
branch dynamics of surveillance regulation both descriptively and
normatively.2 90 When scholarly work has emphasized any particular technology,
288. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010) (arguing that Fourth Amendment protections for online commu-
nications generally track, and should continue to track, a content/noncontent distinction);
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARv. L. REV.
476 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory] (arguing that the evolution
of Fourth Amendment law has balanced - and should continue to balance - changes in crim-
inal and government technical capabilities); K err, supra note 31 (arguing that the evolution of
Fourth Amendment law reflects four distinct conceptions of constitutional privacy); K err, su-
pra note 29 (describing how constitutional privacy protections have applied and should con-
tinue to apply to transborder data flows).
289. See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 31 (recommending that Fourth Amendment law track stat-
utory and common law privacy protections that apply to private actors); Daskal, supra note
29 (recommending that Fourth Amendment information privacy law abandon territoriality
restrictions); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of
Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009) (recommending that constitu-
tional privacy protections track Lockean social contract theory and social norms); Nita A.
Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1239 (2012) (recommending using intellectual
property law as a metaphor for Fourth Amendment protections); Paul Ohm, The Fourth
Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309 (2012) (recommending a new bal-
ancing approach for Fourth Amendment protections); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61
STAN. L. REv. 101 (2008) (recommending reconceptualization of the Fourth Amendment as a
right to security against state action); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not
To Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REv. 1069 (2014) (recommend-
ing reconceptualization of the Fourth Amendment as a protection for personal sovereignty);
Solove, supra note 31 (recommending a new framework for Fourth Amendment law that em-
phasizes procedure over coverage).
290. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L.
REv. 1117 (2017) (reviewing judicial approaches to how congressional enactments influence
Fourth Amendment articulation, and recommending that courts should independently inter-
pret constitutional privacy protections); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal
Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement
Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485 (2013) (noting tendencies in congressional surveillance reg-




it has tended to blast the application of old and lax doctrine as unwise and in
need of course correction.2 91
Law enforcement hacking furnishes an opportunity for a new type of theo-
retical project on the application of the Fourth Amendment to electronic surveil-
lance. The associated technologies are not pervasive and are not widely under-
stood. In the courts, doctrinal puzzles are novel and unsolved; in the executive
branch, prosecutors and agents are still hashing out their views; in Congress,
legislators are just starting to take notice. In other words, the theoretical nexus
for law enforcement hacking is not quite backward-looking or forward-look-
ing- we are currently smack in the middle of the federal government's policy
development process for electronic surveillance regulation.
This unique vantage point enables government malware to function as a nat-
ural experiment for testing Fourth Amendment hypotheses. Law enforcement
hacking provides evidence - real, live, facts-on-the-ground evidence - about
whether government practice aligns with scholarly approaches to the Fourth
Amendment, and, if it does, what the consequences are.
This Part examines law enforcement hacking as a case study for three
longstanding theoretical debates. First, what are the relative competencies of the
three branches of the federal government when articulating electronic surveil-
lance policy? Second, does Fourth Amendment doctrine seek to balance the ca-
pabilities of criminals and law enforcement, and should it? Third, how should
common law and statutory privacy protections inform the scope of Fourth
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV. 205 (2015) (ex-
plaining how the Fourth Amendment can regulate policy, not just line-level police officers);
Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039
(2016) (recommending implementation of administrative law strategies as a component of
Fourth Amendment surveillance regulation).
291. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored Email,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121 (recommending against application of the third-party doctrine to
stored email content); Maureen E. Brady, The Lost "Effects" of the Fourth Amendment: Giving
Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946 (2016) (recommending constitutional pri-
vacy protection for location surveillance, based on reinvigoration of the Fourth Amendment's
"effects" language); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REv. 681 (2011) (recommending Fourth Amendment
protection for cellphone location data); Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth
Amendment, 56 UCLAL. REV. 27 (2008) (recommending limits on the search incident to arrest
doctrine as applied to electronic devices); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty
States: How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs To Protect Third-Party Infor-
mation from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 373 (2o6) (recommending limits on the
third-party doctrine as applied to electronic surveillance); Rene McDonald Hutchins, Tied
Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409 (2007) (rec-
ommending Fourth Amendment scrutiny for GPS -based location tracking).
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Amendment safeguards? The following Sections respectively address these three
areas of theoretical controversy.
A. The Interbranch Dynamics of Surveillance Regulation
1. Competing Judicial and Scholarly Perspectives
According to one strand of Fourth Amendment theory, the courts should not
be the primary regulators of electronic surveillance. The leading judicial propo-
nent is Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit, who has forcefully argued that
Congress should be the lead branch for government privacy protection.29 2 Writ-
ing for a unanimous panel in In re Askin, Judge Wilkinson concluded that federal
agents had not effectuated a Fourth Amendment search when they intercepted a
cordless telephone call because of a (since eliminated) Wiretap Act exception for
cordless telephones.293 Making decisions about surveillance policy, he reasoned,
"demands a comprehension of complex technologies."2 94 Congress has access to
"the type of expertise that courts are . . . ill-equipped to acquire and to apply," so
it should have the "primary job" of evaluating privacy impacts and updating the
law.295
Judge Wilkinson recently refined his perspective in a concurring opinion in
United States v. Graham, agreeing that investigators did not conduct a Fourth
Amendment search when they obtained cell-site location information under the
Stored Communications Act. 296 The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, he emphasized, a term that is "literally crying out for balance
between the competing interests of individual privacy and societal security."2 97
Congress is the appropriate branch to strike that balance because of its greater
access to expertise, greater ability to achieve legal consistency, and greater dem-
ocratic legitimacy in making "high stakes and highly controversial" tradeoffs.29 8
Several Supreme Court Justices appear to have shared Judge Wilkinson's
view -but with an important clarification. Writing in dissent in Dalia v. United
States, Justice Stevens made the similar argument that surveillance legislation
292. See Kerr, supra note 290, at 1130-31 (tracing Judge Wilkinson's views); Sklansky, supra note
286, at 225-27 (similar).
293. 47 F. 3 d loo, 104-o6 (4 th Cir. 1995).
294. Id. at 1o6.
295. Id.
296. 824 F.3 d 421, 438 (4 th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 439.




should receive "special deference" from the courts because "Congress is better
equipped than the Judiciary" to establish "a 'reasonable' accommodation" be-
tween privacy and law enforcement.2 99 But that deference should apply only
when Congress affirmatively authorizes a particular surveillance technique and
establishes specific procedures for investigators. 00
Justice Alito articulated a similar perspective in his concurrence in Riley v.
California, writing that Congress and the state legislatures "are in a better posi-
tion" than the courts to "respond to [technological] changes" and balance pri-
vacy and law enforcement.' He "would reconsider" his position if Congress
responded by enacting a statute that specifically regulated mobile phone searches
incident to arrest. 3 0 2
The key theoretical divide between Judge Wilkinson and Justices Stevens
and Alito is how they perceive the spectrum from congressional action to inac-
tion. For Judge Wilkinson, any statute that establishes a procedure for a surveil-
lance practice deserves great deference. In Graham, for instance, he deferred to a
statute that was twenty years old and did not directly address the technology at
issue. For Justices Stevens and Alito, by contrast, legislation only deserves con-
stitutional deference if it speaks clearly about a specific surveillance technique in
its modern context.
In a provocative 2004 article, Orin Kerr staked out a radical version of the
prolegislature theory.303 He argued that the courts should not only be reluctant
to impose Fourth Amendment protections when Congress has acted, but also
when Congress has not acted. Judicial privacy protections, Kerr argued in a sub-
sequent article, risk "discourag[ing] legislative action by fostering a sense that
the courts have occupied the field."3 04 "The absence of judicial regulation invites
legislative action."o3 0
Several scholars have sharply criticized the prolegislature strand of Fourth
Amendment theory and Kerr's version in particular. Dan Solove disputes that
299. 441 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300. Id.
301. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
302. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 426-29 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting a similar point).
303. K err, supra note 286, at 806; see also Sklansky, supra note 286, at 226, 229-30 (explaining K err's
argument).
304. K err, supra note 121, at 350.
305. Id. In recent work, K err appears to have significantly walked back this theory, arguing that
judicial deference and inaction are only warranted to the extent that technology remains in
flux; once technology has stabilized, courts should independently articulate surveillance reg-
ulation. See K err, supra note 290, at 1149-57.
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Congress is inherently superior to the courts at crafting functional rules, keeping
up with technological innovation, or understanding new technologies -in fact,
he argues, the courts have been more successful at fashioning effective remedies
and avoiding unprincipled gaps in coverage.30 6 Courts may be slow and clumsy
in reacting to new technology, but at least they do react - and they have effective
tools for understanding new technologies (including experts and amici).sor
David Sldansky has raised similar objections to the prolegislature theory.as
Courts benefit from an adversarial process, he argues, with better representation
for competing security and privacy interests (and less overrepresentation of law
enforcement).' The process of case-by-case adjudication also provides an ef-
fective vehicle for legal reform as technology evolves. 1 o
Erin Murphy has staked out a middle ground on the relative roles of the leg-
islature and the judiciary in surveillance regulation. Based on a review of federal
privacy statutes, Murphy concluded that congressional enactments are generally
belated and piecemeal, excessively deferential to law enforcement interests, in-
sufficiently protective of marginalized groups and the economically disadvan-
taged (who tend to disproportionately become criminal defendants), and lim-
ited in the safeguards and remedies that they provide.' The better approach to
the Fourth Amendment, she argues, is an "interbranch dialogue" in which nei-
ther Congress nor the courts "assume sole or even primary responsibility for reg-
ulating privacy."312
The author's own view, tentatively, is most similar to Murphy's. In the au-
thor's contemporaneous experience as a legislative aide, there is almost no tech-
nical expertise on Capitol Hill, limited legal expertise on surveillance matters,
disproportionate deference to the DOJ's assertions about law and policy, and
pervasive drive to win support from law enforcement interest groups and appear
"tough" on criminal justice issues. Lobbying by the DOJ and the Intelligence
Community is frequent, sophisticated, and often at the member level. The exec-
utive branch is also exceptionally effective at leveraging its gatekeeping power
over law enforcement and foreign intelligence information, inhibiting oversight
306. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 761-74 (2005).
307. Id. at 771-73.
308. Sklansky, supra note 286, at 227-33.
309. Id. at 227; see also Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REv. 904, 914-15
(2004) (arguing that the law enforcement community holds public choice advantages in con-
gressional surveillance regulation).
310. Sklansky, supra note 286, at 227.
311. Murphy, supra note 290, at 495-525.




and creating a skewed perspective of policies and practices. Civil society groups
that advocate for privacy protections are consistently inexperienced at lobbying,
disorganized, off-message, and disconnected from decision makers. While the
technology sector has previously participated in surveillance debates, it is in-
creasingly distant from the topic owing to competing priorities.
Meanwhile, the author has had a number of opportunities to engage directly
with the federal judiciary on surveillance matters, and has been consistently im-
pressed by the intellectual curiosity and engagement of members of the bench.
While the federal judiciary does lack technical expertise, it possesses unambigu-
ous legal expertise, and its members exhibit a commitment to understanding
novel law enforcement practices.
The author recognizes the democratic legitimacy of the legislative branch in
articulating surveillance regulation and believes that Congress should play a
more active role on the topic. But the author also believes that the judicial branch
has its own unique legitimacy from its independence, sophistication, and coun-
ter-majoritarian record of protecting disfavored communities. The author's pref-
erence is an iterative process for developing surveillance law, leveraging the com-
parative advantages of each branch. A good template is wiretap doctrine, which
emerged from an interplay between an executive branch commission, DOJ guid-
ance, Supreme Court opinions, and a carefully crafted legislative framework.
Experience with law enforcement hacking will not resolve these weighty and
longstanding theoretical debates about interbranch articulation of surveillance
regulation. But it does offer several points of illumination for the scholarly dis-
course, presented in the following Sections.
2. The Executive Branch Can Self-Regulate Privacy Practices Through
Interagency Processes
Fourth Amendment theory has tended to neglect the role of interagency pol-
icy development within the executive branch."' Articles and opinions that ad-
dress interbranch dynamics tend to assume that the executive branch is synony-
mous with the law enforcement community and that investigative interests will
consistently trample privacy considerations. In their view, we must rely on the
313. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 309, at 914 ("The regulated industry of law enforcement has a con-
centrated interest in reducing regulation -pushing for fewer warrants, less onerous reporting
requirements, and so on.'). There are recent, noteworthy exceptions to this generalization.
See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015) (describing how federal
agencies collaborate to enhance surveillance capabilities); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from
Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (2013) (de-
scribing how inspectors general can constrain national security surveillance).
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judiciary and the legislature to keep the zealous executive branch at bay. But ex-
perience with government malware shows that there is not always identity of
interests among components of the executive branch. While the FBI was pre-
pared to engage in law enforcement hacking without obtaining warrants, the
Department of Justice, via its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section,
was able to impose the Fourth Amendment's procedural safeguards.3 14
This phenomenon of interagency dialogue and oversight is not unique to
malware. In the fall of 2015, the DOJ (note: not the FBI) imposed a requirement
that cell-site simulators - devices used to track mobile phone location - only be
operated pursuant to ordinary search warrants."' Just a month later, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (note: not Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Customs and Border Protection, or the Secret Service) followed the DOJ's lead
and implemented a nearly identical policy.316
These episodes of interagency surveillance constraints are, to be sure, excep-
tions to the norm. The executive branch unambiguously (and by design) seeks
to vigorously investigate criminal activity with a powerful array of surveillance
tools. But any account of the interbranch dynamics for Fourth Amendment pro-
tection must also acknowledge the powerful role of intra-branch dynamics and,
especially, interagency policy development. 1
3. Executive Branch Privacy Protections Can Exceed Judicial and Legislative
Protections
As a corollary to the executive branch's ability to self-regulate through inter-
agency processes, sometimes the executive branch adopts more privacy-protec-
tive procedures than are required by the courts or by Congress. In the context of
314. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
315. Department ofJustice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology, U.S. DEP'T JUST.
(Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [http://perma.cc/YTX2
-YWSA]; Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces
-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators [http://perma.cc/JXL9-LBRR].
316. Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Deputy Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Component
Chiefs, Department Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%2oPolicy
%2oRegarding%20the%2OUse%200f%2OCell-Site%2OSimulator%2oTechnology.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R2C3-FEGU].
317. Cf Renan, supra note 290, at 1115-23 (discussing options for intra-executive oversight of sur-
veillance, with an emphasis on review for efficacy); Sinnar, supra note 313, at 1055-78 (discuss-





law enforcement hacking, FBI agents appear to have consistently applied for
warrants to hack, and prosecutors have occasionally stipulated that hacking con-
stitutes a Fourth Amendment search."' About half of lower courts have never-
theless responded by telling the executive branch that it need not go to the trou-
ble: there is no search, and warrants are not necessary.' Congress, meanwhile,
has declined to enact legislation in response.3 20 This state of constitutional and
statutory affairs may be temporary, as just one appellate court has reviewed
whether the Fourth Amendment regulates law enforcement hacking, and Con-
gress could still take action. At least for now, though, the executive branch is
exceeding what some courts and Congress have required.
As with the phenomenon of executive branch self-regulation, it is important
not to overstate this observation. Though it may be unusual for the executive
branch to voluntarily exceed the bare minimum of surveillance procedure, it can
happen, and it is an important consideration for Fourth Amendment theory that
the judiciary and the legislature are not always the pro-privacy branches.
4. Courts Exhibit Regulatory Capture in Law Enforcement Surveillance
Litigation
Another lesson from experience with government hacking is that the judici-
ary's independence from the law enforcement community is somewhat circum-
scribed. In the district courts in particular, federal prosecutors are consummate
repeat players, and defendants in hacking cases tend to be unsympathetic.32 1 The
result appears to be a (mild) form of regulatory capture, in which prosecutorial
arguments receive unusual deference. In the earliest district court opinions con-
cluding that government malware is not a Fourth Amendment search, for exam-
ple, the reasoning appears to be borrowed directly from prosecutorial briefing.3 22
318. See supra Section I.C.2.i.
319. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
320. See infra Section III.A.6.
321. See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 621-22 (E.D. Va. 2016) ("The Court
finds that due to the especially pernicious nature of child pornography and the continuing
harm to the victims, the balance between any Tor user's alleged privacy interests and the Gov-
ernment's deployment of the NIT ... weighs in favor of ... [the] use of technology to coun-
teract the measures taken by people who access child pornography online. The Government's
efforts to contain child pornographers, terrorists and the like cannot remain frozen in
time. . . ." (footnote omitted)).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *7 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (accepting the government's position uncritically in three sentences);
Government's Response to Second Motion to Suppress and Request for Franks Hearing at 17,
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A number of commenters have observed that courts suffer from regulatory cap-
ture in the context of national security surveillance;323 the same can occur in
more routine criminal surveillance litigation.3 24
5. Courts Are Capable of Understanding Novel Surveillance Technology
Another takeaway for Fourth Amendment theory is that we need not be so
concerned that the judiciary will be unable to understand modern technology.3 25
To be sure, Tor is complex software and some opinions on law enforcement hack-
ing do contain technical errors and oversights.326 But, for the most part, the
courts (or perhaps their clerks) have done a respectable job of understanding
and explaining Tor and law enforcement hacking. 32 7
FIGURE 2.
FEDERAL COURT OPINIONS ON WHETHER LAW ENFORCEMENT HACKING TO OBTAIN AN IP
ADDRESS CONSTITUTES A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
-- -* *+ -*em- m-ae e * -+- --
1/1/2016 1/1/2017 1/1/2018
* Fourth Amendment Search a No Fourth Amendment Search
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-0 53 51-RJB, 2016 WL 337263; United States' Response to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress at 2, 6-7, Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-0 53 5 1-RJB, 2016 WL 337263.
323. See, e.g., Conor Clarke, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber Stamp?: Ex
Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125 (2014) (engaging with
claims that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court exhibits regulatory capture).
324. See, e.g., K evin S. Bankston, Only the DOJKnows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41
U.S.F. L. REv. 589, 589-90 (2007) (describing how criminal surveillance law is often articu-
lated in an ex parte posture, involving de facto deference to the Department of Justice's views).
325. Cf Solove, supra note 3o6, at 771-73 (contesting the premise that legislatures are better
equipped to deal with new technologies than judges).
326. See, e.g., Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593-94 (asserting that Tor protects a user's IP address
without any explanation of how it does so, which is essential for evaluating whether obtaining
a Tor user's IP address constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Werdene,
188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (claiming wrongly that the defendant's "IP address
was subsequently bounced from node to node within the Tor network").
327. See, e.g., United States v. Eure, No. 2:16-cr-43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *1-4 (E.D. Va. July 28,
2016); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 524-27 (E.D. Va. 2016); United States v.




Figure 2 traces the issuance of federal opinions on whether hacking is a
search. It illustrates that early opinions on this issue, in the first half of 2016,
tended to hold that hacking was not necessarily a search; the more recent opin-
ions have reached the opposite - and, as this Article argues, correct - conclusion.
A review of the underlying opinions suggests that the reason for the mid-
2016 inversion is that district courts learned from each other. Not coincidentally,
the early district court opinions that offered the best technical explanation of Tor
and government malware tended to conclude that law enforcement hacking is a
Fourth Amendment search.328 The longitudinal process of case-by-case articu-
lation allowed those courts to act as thought leaders, such that subsequent opin-
ions could build upon their factual explanation and legal analysis.329 Thus, while
each individual court might not be particularly technically sophisticated, in the
aggregate and over time, the district courts are converging on accurate facts and
sound law.
This phenomenon suggests a broader lesson for Fourth Amendment theory
and judicial sophistication about novel surveillance technologies. When the law
enforcement community deploys a new surveillance capability in a manner that
will be litigated with frequency in myriad venues, there is less cause for concern
(at least in the long run) about the judiciary's familiarity with new technology.
When a law enforcement agency deploys a one-off, bespoke surveillance tech-
nology, by contrast, courts will not benefit from each other's wisdom. In these
cases, litigants and judges will need to be more attuned to seeking technical input
and engaging with technical details.
6. Congress Is Not Taking Action
Perhaps the most important lesson for interbranch development of surveil-
lance regulation is that Congress has done nothing to respond to law enforce-
ment hacking. There is no legislation- neither introduced nor in draft form-
that would establish procedural guardrails for government malware. The sole
effort at legislative action, championed by Senator Ron Wyden, is a bill that
would prevent the government from conducting watering hole attacks. 3 o De-
spite vocal opposition to the practice - with Google and a range of civil society
328. E.g., United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 360-61, 363-64 (D. Mass. 2016) (explain-
ing both Tor and the government's malware); Arterbury, 2016 BL 133752, at *1-2 (similar).
329. E.g., United States v. Workman, 863 F.3 d 1313, 1315-16 (loth Cir. 2017) (providing an expla-
nation and an essentially accurate step-by-step diagram of law enforcement hacking).
330. Stopping Mass HackingAct, S. 2952, 114 th Cong. (2016); see also Stopping Mass Hacking Act,
H.R. 5321, 114 th Cong. (2016) (proposing identical language in the House of Representa-
tives).
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groups registering their protests"' - Senator Wyden's bill has only mustered five
cosponsors in the Senate and six in the House of Representatives.33 2
Whatever the abstract merits of congressional primacy in surveillance regu-
lation, the reality is that Congress is not currently in the business of regulating
surveillance. As long as that remains the case - whatever the institutional limits
of the judiciary and however much it should defer to affirmative legislative en-
actments - the courts must remain the primary check and balance for electronic
surveillance.
B. Equilibrium-Adjustment and Substitution Theories Are Indeterminate and
Risk Misleading Courts
In a separate strand of Fourth Amendment theory, scholars have wrestled
with how to substantively reconcile evolving technology and established law.
One prominent approach, occasionally invoked by the judiciary and recently for-
malized by Orin Kerr, attempts to preserve the balance between criminal and law
enforcement technical capabilities. In a 2009 article, Kerr argued that the Fourth
Amendment should not protect technologies that create "substitution" effects by
enabling criminals to remove their activity from unprotected public spaces.' In
a 2011 sequel, Kerr refined and generalized the equilibrium-adjustment theory,
arguing that Fourth Amendment safeguards should be calibrated to perpetuate
an established balance between privacy and policing.334
Academic reactions to Kerr's theory have been mixed. In perhaps the most
comprehensive response, Paul Ohm argues that equilibrium adjustment is a
helpful intellectual framework for exploring Fourth Amendment dilemmas, but
has no normative force of its own.' Recognizing the existence of a balance
sheet, Ohm explains, does not inform what should go into each column- nor
does it explain how to tally up and compare the columns.33 6
331. See, e.g., Richard Salgado, A Small Rule Change that Could Give the U.S. Government Sweeping
New Warrant Power, GOOGLE PUB. POL'Y BLOG (Feb. 18, 2015), http://publicpolicy.google-
blog.com/2o15/o2/a-small-rule-change-that-could-give-us.html [http://perma.cc/PSB4
-UBVY].
332. Cosponsors: H.R.nl1o - 115 th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.Gov, http://www.congress
.gov/bill/ 15th-congress/house-bill/ilo/cosponsors [http://perma.cc/4RZP-T4RX]; Co-
sponsors: S.406 - n15 th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.Gov, http://WWW.congress.gov/bill
/115th-congress/senate-bill/4o6/cosponsors [http://perma.cc/KD2KC-6GYL].
333. Kerr, supra note 147, at 573-81.
334. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory, supra note 288.
335. Ohm, supra note 289, at 1339-47.




David Sklansky has raised similar concerns.3 The process of equilibrium
adjustment, Sklansky observes, requires selecting a target balance of privacy and
law enforcement. But the process of selecting a reference point requires an un-
derlying policy judgment." What's more, privacy protection and law enforce-
ment power have myriad and unquantifiable dimensions."' Even if there were a
reference point, any measurement comparing against the reference point would
be laden with additional policy judgments.
The present wave of litigation addressing government malware provides a
case study in the feasibility and consequences of equilibrium adjustment. The
experience lends substantial support to the criticisms advanced by Ohm and
Sklansky and suggests that equilibrium adjustment is not just indeterminate,
but also prone to leading courts astray.
Beginning with the indeterminacy problem, articulating a definitive equilib-
rium-adjustment narrative for law enforcement hacking is an impossible task.
First, what is the appropriate reference point for calibrating the policing and pri-
vacy interests associated with government hacking?3 4 0 Is it 1791, when the
Fourth Amendment was ratified? Is it 1876, when Alexander Graham Bell re-
ceived a patent for the telephone? What about 1968, when researcher Douglas
Engelbart gave the "mother of all demos" that foreshadowed modern personal
computers? How about 1990, when Tim Berners-Lee developed the web? Equi-
librium adjustment is, essentially, a type of techno-originalism-but without a
distinct constitutional moment to serve as a point of reference.
Moreover, even if there were a definitive reference point, calculating the equi-
librium adjustment for law enforcement hacking would still be hopelessly inde-
terminate. On the law enforcement side of the ledger, criminals use Tor to mask
their illicit online activity and use encryption to frustrate access to communica-
tions and stored data. In the civil liberties column, government malware is diffi-
cult for courts to supervise, easily mistargeted, and rife with risk for negative
social costs.34 1 From a broader societal perspective, Tor provides legitimate and
337. Sklansky, supra note 286, at 233-41.
338. See id. at 236-37.
339. Id. at 237-38.
340. Id. at 236 & n.90.
341. See, e.g., Azam Ahmed & Nicole Perlroth, Using Texts as Lures, Government Spyware Targets
Mexican journalists and Their Families, N.Y. TIMEs (June 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes
.com/2o17/o6/19/world/americas/mexico-spyware-anticrime.html [http://perma.cc/215K
-5 7 FF] (reporting how elements of the Mexican government appear to have targeted journal-
ists with malware). See generally supra Section II.G (discussing risks and negative externalities
associated with law enforcement hacking).
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valuable functionality, such as enabling internet access and anonymity for dissi-
dents living under repressive regimes,342 and encryption is a critical safeguard
against online crime and data breach.34 3 The theory of equilibrium adjustment
requires that we measure up and balance these policing, privacy, and societal
considerations in comparison to a reference point. But how? Any answer must
necessarily resort to an extrinsic normative framework.
The indeterminacy that Ohm and Sklansky identify is not the only short-
coming of the equilibrium-adjustment approach. Lower court experience with
law enforcement hacking highlights an additional, practical danger associated
with the equilibrium-adjustment theory. In reaching the conclusion that govern-
ment malware is not necessarily a Fourth Amendment search, courts have ex-
plained their reasoning in various ways: a defendant "should not be rewarded for
allegedly obtaining contraband through his virtual travel through interstate and
foreign commerce on a Tor hidden service,"344 should not "serendipitously receive
Fourth Amendment protection because he used Tor in an effort to evade detec-
tion,"345 and "cannot conceal his deviant behavior through Internet tricks."346
These opinions reflect a specific version of equilibrium adjustment. The ref-
erence point is that, prior to adoption of anonymizing technology, law enforce-
ment investigators could obtain a suspect's IP address without a search warrant.
The deviation from that reference point is that criminals have an enhanced tech-
nical capability (anonymizing software) that frustrates conventional investiga-
tive techniques. As a counterbalance, novel law enforcement measures (hacking)
that circumvent the new criminal capability should not be subject to heightened
procedural requirements.
This type of myopic equilibrium adjustment focuses on just one side of the
ledger-the enhanced capabilities that technology affords to criminals-and
adopts as its reference point the time immediately preceding introduction of the
new technology. Courts then adjust the equilibrium so that in the period follow-
ing the introduction of the new technology, the government can continue access-
ing the same classes of investigative data with the same legal procedures.
342. Users of Tor, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en [http://perma.cc
/8 5TF-Q266].
343. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114TH CONG., ENCRYPTION WORKING GROUP YEAR-END
REP. (2016), http://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2o16/12/2o16122oEWGFINAL
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/67JE-WBT3].
344. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 621 (E.D. Va. 2016) (emphasis added).
345. United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
346. United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 1 5-oo13 7 -CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *6 (C.D.




If this recurrent reasoning is representative, judicial adoption of equilibrium
adjustment risks a "ratchet-up effect" for warrantless surveillance capabilities.3 47
For each new technology that criminals adopt to conceal evidence, law enforce-
ment can deploy a novel investigative technique that circumvents the criminal
technology without being subject to heightened procedural protections. 348 Equi-
librium adjustment would turn the conventional Fourth Amendment analysis
on its head. Typically, the more an individual takes measures to protect his or her
privacy, the more he or she should be entitled to constitutional privacy protec-
tions.3 49 Equilibrium adjustment risks leading courts to the opposite conclusion,
perversely finding that privacy measures justify additional intrusions.
C. Positive Law Is a Factual Guide, but Not Necessarily a Legal Guide, for
Constitutional Articulation
A third strand of Fourth Amendment theory examines the proper relation-
ship between the privacy protections that regulate private actors (by statute or
common law) and the privacy protections that regulate law enforcement agents
(under the Fourth Amendment). Recent scholarship has explored a range of al-
ternatives: protections against private actors may be completely independent
from constitutional protections, they may inform constitutional doctrine, they
may set a minimum for constitutional safeguards, or they may replace Fourth
Amendment law outright. 5 o
347. Cf Swire, supra note 309, at 914 (describing a "ratchet-up effect" in legislative surveillance
authorities, because law enforcement agencies can persuasively lobby for lesser protections).
348. See id.
349. See, e.g., United States v. Kahler, No. 16-cr-2o551, 2017 WL 586707, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14,
2017) ("The Government argues that, despite using a software which exists only to veil the
user's IP address from prying eyes, the user has no reasonable privacy interest in his or her IP
address. This argument has little to recommend it. If a user who has taken special precautions
to hide his IP address does not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation when a law enforcement
officer compels his computer to disclose the IP address . . . then it is difficult to imagine any
kind of online activity which is protected by the Fourth Amendment.").
350. See, e.g., Baude & Stem, supra note 31, at 1888-89 (proposing that Fourth Amendment regu-
lation of privacy track statutory and common-law regulations of privacy); Kerr, supra note
290 (describing possible relationships between statutory privacy regulation -much of which
restricts both private and government intrusions -and Fourth Amendment privacy regula-
tion); Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REv. F. 313 (2016) (proposing that
statutory and common-law regulations of privacy set a minimum for Fourth Amendment
protections).
657
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The legal response to government malware highlights two noteworthy ele-
ments of the relationship between positive law and Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. First, regulation of private actors can furnish a valuable analytical frame-
work for puzzling through fact patterns involving government actors. The
CFAA, the primary federal computer crime statute, expressly does not apply to
law enforcement activities."' But the way in which the CFAA dissects computer
trespass - analyzing security and privacy interests both in computer systems and
in the data that they store - constitutes a signpost for Fourth Amendment eval-
uation.35 2 The analysis in Part I, for example, was inspired by the CFAA's pro-
tections for both devices and data. Thus, regardless of whether positive law sub-
stantively shapes or replaces constitutional privacy doctrine, positive law has an
important role in framing fact patterns for constitutional analysis.
The connection between the CFAA and the Fourth Amendment also high-
lights why positive law alone cannot satisfactorily scope constitutional privacy
protections. Under current CFAA doctrine, a website operator can establish lia-
bility by sending a cease-and-desist letter to a would-be defendant; any further
website access by the defendant is actionable as computer trespass.' But imag-
ine the result if the same standard scoped Fourth Amendment protection. If the
operator of a criminal website sent a cease-and-desist letter to the director of the
FBI, would federal agents then need to obtain a warrant to access the website?
The hypothetical is an absurdity, of course, and contrary to current doctrine: law
enforcement agents are permitted to enter any areas that are reasonably open to
the public.354 But it highlights that positive law can sometimes be too protective
of privacy to function as a plausible Fourth Amendment stand-in.
351. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(h), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2012).
352. See Mayer, supra note 159, at 1663-64 (describing how the CFAA protects both devices and
data).
353. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1o58, 1065-69 ( 9 th Cit. 2016) (allowing
a CFAA claim where the plaintiff expressly and completely revoked defendant's authorization
by letter); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181-84 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same);
Weingand v. Harland Fin. Solutions, Inc., No. C-11-31o9 EMC, 2012 WL 2327660, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 19, 2012) (allowing a CFAA claim where the plaintiff arguably delineated the de-
fendant's authorization by verbal statement); Mayer, supra note 159, at 1654-56 (describing
"without authorization" liability under CFAA).
354. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that "the government's
intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the





The government's track record with law enforcement hacking is hardly stel-
lar. Descriptions of malware are often ambiguous and euphemistic.' The gov-
ernment has strained the Fourth Amendment, asserting that no warrant is re-
quired at all (Part I), or that a warrant is only required for a moment (Section
II.A). Agents have botched probable cause and particularity, possibly leading to
hacks of innocent users (Section II.B). Warrant applications have ignored venue
restrictions established by statute and rule (Section II.C), as well as the unam-
biguous time limits of Rule 41 (Section II.D). Almost every unsealed warrant for
identification malware relies upon conditional notice, in violation of Rule 41 and
(possibly) the Fourth Amendment (Section II.E). And, finally, the government
has not properly applied for super-warrants in scenarios where they are required
(Section II.F). This string of procedural defects should weigh heavily in favor of
heightened judicial scrutiny, such as an across-the-board super-warrant require-
ment (Section II.G).
In the years to come, government hacking will only become more common.
Law enforcement agencies have expressed their alarm about the increasing per-
vasiveness of device and communications encryption, which frustrates conven-
tional electronic surveillance techniques.35 6 Malware is one of the few technical
countermeasures available to the government.
Law enforcement agencies should be able to hack. It can be a legitimate and
effective investigative technique. There is nothing inherently wrong with the
355. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753
(S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying and criticizing a malware warrant application); Stanford Ctr. for
Internet & Soc'y, In Conversation: The Hon. Stephen W Smith and Former Magistrate
Judge Paul S. Grewal, YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch.v=3
-fycsuHXpU [http://perma.cc/SBX4-U43A] (explaining that "many judges ... don't exactly
know what they are being presented with" and applications can include "a very anodyne term
like 'network investigative technique"').
356. See James B. Comey, Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety
and Privacy, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (July 8, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news
/testimony/going-dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balances-between-public-safety
-and-privacy [http://perma.cc/K4FQ-B7VX] ("[E]ncryption as currently implemented
poses real barriers to law enforcement's ability to seek information. . . ."); Sally Quillian
Yates, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Oral Testimony Before the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (July 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/deputy-attorney- general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-oral-testimony-senate-judiciary
[http://perma.cc/32QD-GAYV] (" [E]ncryption has been designed so that the information is
only available to the user and the providers are unable to comply with the court order or war-
rant.").
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government compromising computer systems. But appropriate procedural pro-
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